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 Best value is rapidly becoming one of the most commonly used procurement 
methods in the facility construction industry. The Federal Government and the Air Force 
Reserve predominant project delivery approach has been via the low-bid award. This 
process has not been successful, documented by large numbers of construction 
modifications, as well as project cost and schedule growth over the past sixteen years. 
Recently, federal procurement agencies have attempted to move toward construction 
awards based upon best value principles relative to performance and price. Among the 
obstacles to this transition are the wide discrepancies in the professional military 
construction contracting and delivery community’s understanding of just what constitutes 
best value in a construction contract. Other obstacles include consensus on how to 
determine which contractor represents the best value in accomplishment of the work, how 
to place definitive monetary values on comparative risk of various contractor proposals, 
and who should identify and control risks associated with execution of the project. 
Implementation of a system to identify and document past performance in motivating 
contractors to improve performance is essential. What is required is the movement from a 
construction award system based only upon price and minimum qualifications to a system 
that emphasizes the value offered by each contractor proposal. Transition to a bona fide 
best value project delivery system similar to Dr. Dean Kashiwagi’s Performance 
Information Procurement System can revamp the current Air Force Reserve military 
construction procurement environment to the benefit of both Air Force Reserve 
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Chapter One – Introduction 
 
 
 Construction procurement based solely upon the lowest responsible bid price from 
an eligible contractor qualified to perform the work along with a Design-Bid-Build 
delivery method has been the project delivery system of choice in the Air Force Reserve 
Command (AFRC) since its inception. Application of this delivery system assumes that 
construction quality and performance are assured by adherence to the solicitation package 
specifications and verification that bidders meet some minimal eligibility requirements 
regarding past performance on work of similar nature. This project delivery option / 
selection type combination assumes that all contractors submitting eligible bids for the 
work will perform in an equal manner in terms of quality, skill, risk and time 
management, project control, and customer satisfaction. Therefore the only 
discriminating variable is the price of performance.   
 AFRC as a procurer of real property assets increasingly faces the maladies 
common to both public and private owners attempting to construct and renovate facilities 
and infrastructure in the twenty-first century. Construction costs have risen 
approximately 30% in the past five years due to steel, copper, and paving asphalt prices 
being extremely difficult to forecast as the cost and availability of oil and its products 
continue to fluctuate wildly within relatively short periods of time (Nicholson, 2008). 
Turner Construction Company, the United States leading general builder, announced in 
June 2008 that construction costs over the First Quarter 2008 increased 1.57% and these 
costs were 6.61% higher than those experienced over the Second Quarter of 2007 
(Building Design and Construction, 2008). The Producer Price Index (PPI) for inputs to 
construction industries – materials used in all types of construction plus items consumed 
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by contractors, such as diesel fuel – surged 10.4% over the 12 months preceding August 
2008. The index for highway and street construction leaped 18.9 %. According to Ken 
Simonson, chief economist for The Associated General Contractors of America (AGC) 
―in the first two weeks of July 2008, asphalt prices have jumped by 40 % in several parts 
of the country. Prices for rebar – steel used to reinforce concrete in highways, bridges, 
and buildings – soared $200 per ton.‖ Simonson’s predictions include postulation that, 
―Unless Congress passes additional funding ….many states will stop awarding contracts. 
Other public agencies, as well as private owners, must adjust their budgets promptly to 
reflect the new price realities for construction‖ (Moucka, 2008). 
 Congressionally appropriated Military Construction Projects (MILCONs) often 
have budgets significantly below real construction bid prices. Proposed project financial 
allocations are submitted for congressional approval approximately two years prior to 
actual bid opening. Inflation escalation factors are used to extrapolate construction costs 
to the estimated mid-point of construction in the establishment of these apportioned 
project prices. Not surprisingly, this lengthy appropriation process combined with the 
unpredictable, rising cost of materials has precipitated a significant decline in 
construction contract awards within budgets  in the last 5 AFRC MILCON program 
years. Figure 1 below shows almost a third of these projects were awarded over budget 
(ACES 2009).  


















Figure 1. Air Force Reserve MILCON Program Construction  
Awards above Budget (Air Force ACES 2009) 
 
 Current DOD planning estimates assume declining overall MILCON program 
budgets into the foreseeable future due to national economic and war fighting conditions. 
At the same time, requirements to meet the demands of providing facilities supporting 
worldwide military missions are growing and changing exponentially. This scenario has 
encouraged AFRC and others to expedite the planning and programming phases of 
project concept development often at the expense of proper definition of project scope 
requirements. AFRC is increasingly using the Design-Build delivery method as a tool to 
attempt to accelerate construction award and transfer the risk of price and non-
performance to the contractor. Design-Build can be defined as a project delivery system 
in which a single firm or team agrees to design and construct a project for the owner. The 
owner provides the contractor with its requirements, usually in terms of performance 
specifications. The Design-Builder then designs the project to satisfy these requirements 
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and builds the project once the design is approved (AGC, 2004). However, this can only 
be successfully accomplished if the owner can clearly indicate the requirements in the 
Request for Proposal (RFP) documents and provided they do not change, grow or evolve 
during the Design-Build process (Kashiwagi, 2002). 
 The circumstances described above have driven AFRC, as well as many other 
owners facing swelling requirements and reduced budgets, to seek to make the entire 
project delivery system more proficient. To increase worth one must maximize value 
while minimizing both resources and effort. In this paper I propose to demonstrate that a 
best value construction delivery procurement approach is indispensable if AFRC is to 
remain a steadfast military institution capable of erecting facilities contributory to our 
nation’s defense with increasing efficiency by perpetually adding value to the project 
delivery process. 
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Chapter Two - Research Methodology 
 
 Project data was obtained from the Air Force’s Automated Civil Engineering 
System (ACES) database. This database tracks the milestones of all Air Force facility 
projects from program development through design and construction to beneficial 
occupancy, construction completion and finally financial closeout. After projects are 
completed and financially closed, they move to a historical file within ACES and the 
completed milestone data is available for projects executed over a period of time. At 
present Air Force projects spanning the last sixteen years are available for review, report 
writing and analysis.  
 One hundred forty-seven Air Force Reserve MILCON projects from program 
years 1992 through 2007 were drawn from the database, compiled into a report and 
analyzed. Schedule and cost growth data were evaluated for all projects over the sixteen 
year period as well as comparisons made between projects delivered using price as the 
only selection factor and those delivered with contracts conferred using price and other 
non-price components. The analyses were graphed to show comparisons and ascertain 
trends. It was anticipated that examination of these execution metrics would reveal the 
need to incorporate best value procurement practices into AFRC’s project delivery 
processes. A comparison of price and price plus non-price contractor selection delivery 
methods was expected to show some execution metrics improvement because non-price 
factors integrate the capacity of  the contractor to minimize schedule, budget, and quality 
expectation risks provided  owner requirements do not change. Risk minimization is an 
important attribute of best value procurement. A contractor that cannot identify risks and 
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act in the best interest of the owner will have to be closely managed. Management of the 
contractor reduces the project delivery system’s efficiency which diminishes value and 
increases project risk (Kashiwagi, 2002). 
 A ten question survey was distributed to government, contractor, and engineering 
professionals with participatory experience in the AFRC project delivery process (See 
Appendix A, page 85). The purpose of this survey was to ascertain knowledge of best 
value procurement principles among those likely to be involved in their implementation 
and to garner opinions concerning the applicability of these best value practices to the 
project delivery process. Fifty-four out of sixty-two surveys were returned for a response 
rate of 87%. The results of this questionnaire were consolidated and the responses to each 
question were graphed to show their distributions.    
 A fiscal year 2007 AFRC MILCON project was selected to be a case study for 
best value procurement implementation. The Design-Build delivery method was chosen 
for execution of this project. Air Force Reserve Command requested a solutions-based 
approach to procurement. In a solution-based selection, the owner typically provides its 
budget along with its design criteria, and competing Design-Build firms provide their 
own design solutions, trying to provide the best solution within the owner’s stated budget 
(AGC, 2004). The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the Command’s 
paramount construction program management agency, recommended a best value 
contractor selection method which they called Military Transformation. The results of 
this selection process provided valuable insight into the challenges faced by the 
Government and AFRC to awarding MILCON projects using selection factors other than 
minimally acceptable lowest priced proposals. This case study revealed the costs and 
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performance risks associated with insistence upon acceptance of the lowest priced 
proposal.  
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Chapter Three - Background 
 
 The late great management and quality guru Peter Drucker described a business as 
an organization that adds value and creates wealth. Value is created for customers and 
wealth is generated for owners. According to Drucker not many owners and managers are 
information-literate. They know how to get data but have yet to learn how to use it. To 
meet this information challenge, these executives must remove a serious flaw. As quoted 
by Watson (2002), Drucker stated this flaw as ―the common assumption that conditions 
must be what we think they are or at least what we think they should be. An adequate 
information system must include information that makes executives question this 
assumption.‖ 
 Three basic questions are formulated around delivering value and the 
repercussions for the organization. 
 What is our business today? 
 What will be our business? 
 What should be our business? 
 It is management’s responsibility to discover the answer to these questions and 
implement solutions that deliver results. The critical questions owners and managers must 
ask themselves are: 
 What information do we owe? 
 To whom do we owe it? 
 In what form should we present it? 
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 As stated by Watson (2002), ―Let’s hope that Drucker’s ideas will provide a 
foundation for our continuous learning about how to deliver more value to customers.‖  
 Drucker’s concept of the knowledge worker from the ―Post Capitalist Society‖ 
and just in time from Toyota’s application in lean manufacturing define and propagate 
the use of best value construction. These two concepts are used to structure procurement 
into an information system, which results in performing construction and an improvement 
in contractor capability to produce on-time, on-budget, and meet quality expectations. 
Many performance information issues are resolved using these concepts. 
 In 1991 the Performance Information Procurement System (PIPS) was developed 
by Dr. Dean Kashiwagi at Arizona State University and has been tested extensively since 
1994 (See Appendix C). This system uses the knowledge worker and lean manufacturing 
concepts. The transfer of these concepts from the manufacturing industry to the 
construction industry has been slow due to a lag in technology transfer and required 
education. The new concepts can save the construction business years in transforming to 
a high performance industry by following the pattern of socioeconomic change in the 
production, manufacturing, and managerial industries. PIPS uses the difference between 
the service worker and the knowledge worker to show how to increase construction 
performance (Kashiwagi and Slater, 2000). 
 Construction has typically been viewed as a production process, with the product 
being the completed facility. In addition to providing this product, however, contractors 
also provide services. The construction services furnished range from meeting 
periodically with the owner’s representatives to offering customer satisfaction. 
Construction purchasers, given the choice, would prefer not to base their selection 
decision solely on the construction product provided but rather the entire smorgasbord of 
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products and services inherent to the process. There is no natural demand for the 
construction product; the demand for the construction product is derived from the 
demand for the intended use of the facility. As a case in point, there is no natural demand 
for a manufacturing facility; the demand for the facility derives from the demand for the 
product that is to be manufactured in that facility. Necessity for cars generates a demand 
for auto parts and assembly plants. The client’s primary concerns are when the facility 
will be available and what it will cost. These two factors significantly influence the 
economic viability of the project. Completion of the project in accordance with the plans 
and specifications within budget and on time will satisfy the client’s needs and allow the 
contractor to make a profit. However this criterion alone does not guarantee that the 
client will desire working with the contractor on future projects. The contractor’s skilled 
workforce may be a factor in the customer’s decision to select the contractor to perform 
the work. For example, because of a skilled workforce, the customer may have the 
expectation that there will be no rework on the project or service calls to repair something 
after the client has begun to use the facility.  A contractor must have a detailed 
understanding of the customer’s expectations and be able, through his or her personnel, to 
satisfy those expectations (Maloney, 2002). 
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Chapter Four - Information Theory 
 
 The intelligent use of information whether by human beings or machines involves 
the following areas of concern: 
1. Selection of appropriate information along with adequate commands to obtain this 
information, 
2. Comparison with previously obtained information, 
3. An ordering of actions based on preferences and expected results. 
Information implies not only the presence of messages and symbols but requires that the 
meaning of these be taken into account. Meaning is intimately associated with the context 
of the information. Individuals attempt to control certain observables in their 
environment. These desired environmental effects can be called goals and when a person 
responds to an event in accordance with these goals this response is referred to as an 
appropriate response or one is said to be acting intelligently (Pedelty, 1963). 
 An event is a significant occurrence that triggers an activity or process that must 
be recognized and reacted to (Young, 1987).  In the absence of appropriate current 
information about an event, humans revert to previously obtained information and 
opinions and make decisions with unpredictable results. This unpredictability infuses 
risks into an enterprise. 
 Figure 2 shows the decision making Kashiwagi Solution Model (KSM). The 
premise of this model is that decisions are made when information cannot be perceived. 
The more information that is available, the easier it is to predict the outcome and 
minimize decision making and risks. As demonstrated by the model, if someone has ―all‖ 
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information no decision is necessary. Some people describe the impact of information as 
making the decision easier. Every event is constrained by the initial conditions that cause 
predictable conclusions. A Type A organization (represented by the top dark circle in the 
figure below) can be characterized as a business entity that constantly perceives more 
information, changing the way they do business. A Type C organization (represented by 
bottom dark circle below), on the other hand, perceives very little information and cannot 
differentiate between options. These business entities need rules to tell them what to do 
because they cannot perceive and differentiate, and therefore change very slowly. A Type 
C organization is usually bureaucratic, resists change with rules, cannot use information, 
and is filled with personnel who feel comfortable in this environment. The Type C 
organization is further distinguished by the following attributes (Kashiwagi, 2002): 
1. Forces its personnel to make decisions to determine if the rules are being 
followed. 
2. Decisions are minimum standards that use the lowest common denominator. 
3. Require means, methods, and specifications to direct marginal services on how to 
do their job. 
4. Require inspection and other means of control (project management) to ensure 
that the marginal services do the minimum specified requirement. 
5. Procure marginal performing services. 

























































Figure 2.  Decision – Information Relationship
(Adapted from Kashiwagi , 2002)
 
                         
 Information is not only an organizational resource but also an asset. Accurate and 
pertinent information empowers a business to produce changes in its environment. The 
reliability of the information in a corporation’s systems database is crucial. Three major 
sources of information system failure are: (1) users withholding information from the 
system, (2) biased information entered into the system, and (3) incorrect updating of the 
database.  
 An enterprise’s information system should provide information within the 
company when and where it is needed at any managerial level. An information system 
should be a logically interrelated set of business processes that accomplish organizational 
goals. 
 Information in an information system environment should have the following 
attributes (Aktas, 1987): 
 Understood by its recipient in the proper frame of reference 
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 Relevant to a current need in a decision-making process 
 Have surprise value; not already known 
 Lead appropriate users to make a decision which could be to take no action 
 Decision making should be the result of the right information made available at 
the right time to the right people within the organization.  
 Decisions should never be driven by a lack of information. The results are 
inefficiency and debilitating hierarchy, rules and structure that impose additional 
restrictions on the organization’s workforce and their ability to perform their tasks.  
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Chapter Five - Construction Industry Structure Model 
 
 The two components of construction industry stability are competition and 
performance. Models like the Construction Industry Structure (CIS) Model, developed by 
Dr. Dean Kashiwagi at Arizona State University help to simplify the problems of the 
construction industry, and show how an information environment will optimize value for 
the owner and profit for the vendors. The CIS model can also be used to identify how the 
industry participants (building owner/users, designers, contractors, and manufacturers) 
can become more efficient. 
 The CIS model (Figure 3 below) divides the industry into four quadrants: 
1. Quadrant I – Low-Bid or Price-Based Sector:  Described by high competition and 
marginal performance. 
2. Quadrant II – Best-Value Sector:  Described by high competition and 
performance. 
3. Quadrant III – Negotiated-Bid Sector:  Described by high performance and low 
competition. 
4. Quadrant IV – Unstable Sector:  Described by low performance and low 
competition. 





































 The Quadrant I low-bid, price-based environment is one in which the process is 
controlled by the owner’s representative. Minimum standards are used to specify 
products and performance. Contractors and manufacturers lower their performance to 
meet the minimum standards in order to save money and thus compete to be the low 
priced offeror. The owner’s professional project managers have to minimize the risks 
caused by specifications and the impact of the low price award through management and 
inspection (See Figure 4). 














Figure 4. The Standards “Great Divide”
High
Contractors:
Standards represent  







Owners:  Standards represent 
minimum  level of quality
(Adapted from Kashiwagi, 2002)
 
 Quadrant II is the best value environment where users consider both performance 
and price. Characteristics of the best value environment are: 
1. Use of performance information. 
2. Contractors and vendors maximize competition by using standards to ensure 
performance. 
3. The contractor is allowed to accept and reduce risk. 
4. The performing contractor controls the construction project. 
5. Forces quality control and continuous improvement. 
6. Minimizes decision-making 
7. Decisions have to be made by the participant with liability and the most 
information. 
8. Continuous efforts to make the delivery system more efficient. 
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The only way to meet the requirements of Quadrant II is for the owner/user’s 
representative to be an information worker. 
 Quadrant III represents a high performance and low competition environment. 
Characteristics of this environment are pre-qualifying contractors and subjectively 
selecting via minimal performance information. Relationships with contractors are built 
by sole source solicitation. Quadrant III is dissolving due to price pressures of the present 
worldwide competitive marketplace. 
 Quadrant IV is unstable. The following are attributes of the Quadrant IV 
environment (Kashiwagi, 2002): 
1. No identification of performance 
2. Contractors with less performance can get paid more 
3. No one has a competitive advantage 
4. Highly political 
5. No real competition 
6. True performers have a difficult time competing 
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Chapter Six - Public Project Procurement 
 
 Public projects are governed by strict statutory and regulatory frameworks 
intended to reduce the risk of fraud, favoritism and undue influence and to reassure 
taxpayers that their tax dollars are being spent properly. In recent years, ―best value‖ 
procurement, i.e. procurement in which a contractor’s  qualifications, design (where 
applicable) and price or cost are weighted against its competitors to identify the 
contractor whose proposal represents the greatest value to the government, has begun to 
encroach upon traditional procurement methods at both the state and federal level. In 
2001 the American Bar Association Model Procurement Code added Design-Build 
procurement as a new project delivery method to assist state and local agencies in 
implementing ―best value‖ procurement. The ultimate goal of best value procurement 
measures is to combine the twin goals of promoting efficiency of private construction 
contracting and taxpayer trust in the procurement process. 
 Historically, public projects have used traditional Design-Bid-Build procurement. 
The Design-Bid-Build method requires separate contracts between the owner and 
designer on the one hand and the owner and the constructor on the other. Contracts are 
awarded to the lowest responsible bidder. Statutory bond requirements allay concerns 
about the ability of the low bidder to perform the project. Payment and performance 
bonds guarantee that subcontractors will be paid and the work will be performed as 
promised. However, the conventional Design-Bid-Build model does not allow the 
government to evaluate contractor bids based on factors other than price. Other concerns 
that could dramatically change the evaluation process include completing the project in 
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the shortest amount of time, incorporating necessary aesthetic or environmental design 
issues, and producing a facility with the lowest long term operating and maintenance 
costs (Heisse, 2002).  
 According to Palaneeswaran, Kumaraswamy, and Ng (2003) the following are 
some key common procurement principles of public clients: 
 Public accountability – since public money is used it should be properly 
―justified.‖ 
 Value for money – in order to achieve the best ―value for money‖, the contractor 
selections should consider competitiveness, compliance with client’s 
requirements, reliability of performance, qualitative superiority, and life-cycle 
costs. 
 Transparency – in order to encourage contractors to be more responsive and 
competitive, all necessary information should be provided to them and all 
selection procedures and evaluation criteria should be clearly outlined and made 
transparent to facilitate their adequate understanding. There should be proper de-
briefing arrangements for providing feedback to unsuccessful contractors. 
 Open, equitable and fair competition – all contractors should be treated on an 
equal footing and it should be ensured that all those eligible are given the same 
information to prepare their proposals. They should be treated in an equitable 
manner without any bias or discrimination. 
 Confidentiality – all proposals and evaluations should ensure adequate 
confidentiality. No information relating to the examination, clarification, and 
evaluation of bids and recommendations concerning awards should be 
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communicated after the public opening of bids to any person not officially 
concerned with these procedures. 
 Propriety/integrity/probity – all procurement procedures should be beyond 
reproach/criticism. The procurement personnel should exercise fair dealing within 
a sound ethical framework. 
 In addition to the above basic procurement principles, the prime objectives 
considered in public sector construction contractor selections should include: 
 Proper delivery of good products and services that adequately meet the outlined 
qualitative and quantitative requirements 
 Minimization of risks 
 Maximization of value for money 
 The Federal Government, Department of Defense (DOD), and AFRC have all had 
difficulty procuring successful construction through the low-bid, design, bid 
specification, procedure. Several programs have been implemented with the intent of 
moving to a best value procurement system where both performance and price are 
considered. As asserted by Kashiwagi and Gardner (2002) success of these programs has 
been hampered by the following: 
1. Inability to change the current bureaucracy to a performance based environment. 
2. Difficulty in identifying performance. 
3. The perception of subjectivity (decisions based on personal perception due to a 
lack of differentiating performance information that proves difficult to explain 
and justify in a bureaucratic environment). 
4. Inability to minimize the risk of nonperformance (on-time, on-budget, meeting 
quality expectations). 
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5. The inability to influence the contractor’s performance based on the potential for 
future work. 
6. The lack of documentation of performance due to the variation of construction 
work and the many unique factors that impact construction performance.  
 From formation through administration, contracting with the Federal Government 
is a highly regulated process. Unlike commercial contracting, which is governed 
generally by the Uniform Commercial Code and the common law, Federal Government 
contracting is governed by a maze of statues and regulations. These statutory and 
regulatory provisions dictate, for example, what method or process an agency must use to 
solicit a contract and how the agency is to negotiate or award a contract. The Armed 
Services Procurement Act of 1947 (ASPA), codified as 10 United States Code (U.S.C) 
&& 2301-2314 governs the acquisition of all property, construction, and services by 
defense agencies including AFRC. The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) codified 
in scattered sections of 10, 31, 40, and 41 U.S.C is applicable to both defense and civilian 
acquisitions and requires federal agencies to seek and obtain ―full and open competition‖ 
whenever possible in the contract award process. 
 The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) – codified in 1984 at Title 48 Chapter 
One of the Code of Federal Regulations – contains the uniform policies and procedures 
for acquisitions by all federal agencies. It implements or addresses nearly every 
procurement-related statue or executive policy. In doing so, the FAR reaches every stage 
of the acquisition process. The FAR reflects Congress’ efforts to create a uniform 
structure for Executive Branch federal contracting. Prior to the FAR, the Department of 
Defense services each had their own set of regulations. The goal of uniformity has been 
somewhat undermined by the numerous agency-specific supplements. These 
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supplements, however, may not conflict with or supersede relevant FAR provisions 
(Vacketta, 1999). 
 AFRC’s two authorized construction program management agencies are the 
United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and the Naval Facilities Engineering 
Command (NAVFAC). These agencies employ the Defense Federal Acquisitions 
Regulation Supplement (DFARS) to apply the FAR acquisitions specifically to AFRC 
MILCON projects.  
 The ASPA and CICA established two basic methods of obtaining ―full and open 
competition‖ – (a) sealed bidding and (b) competitive negotiation. Sealed bidding is 
characterized by a rigid adherence to formal procedures. These procedures aim to provide 
all bidders an opportunity to compete for the contract on an equal footing. In a sealed 
bidding acquisition, the agency must award to the responsible bidder who submits the 
lowest responsible bid (price). In contrast, competitive negotiations is a more flexible 
process that enables the agency to conduct discussions, evaluate offers, and award the 
contract using price and other factors. According to the FAR, the primary objective of 
discussions is to maximize the agency’s ability ―to obtain best value, based on the 
requirement and the evaluation factors set forth in the evaluation.‖ After completion of all 
discussions the Contracting Officer (CO) may request the offerors revise their proposals 
to clarify any compromises reached during negotiations and submit a final proposal 
revision. Subsequently, the CO will undertake a comparative analysis of the final offers 
in accordance with the evaluation procedures set forth in the Request For Proposals 
(RFP), and select the offeror whose proposal is most advantageous to the Government. 
 The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) is responsible for the 
management and oversight of the small business procurement process across the Federal 
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Government. SBA negotiates with federal departments concerning their prime 
contracting goals and achievement with small businesses to ensure that small businesses 
have the maximum practicable opportunity to provide goods and services to the Federal 
Government. Further, the negotiations ensure that the Government will achieve 
construction contract award goals of not less than 23 percent to small businesses, not less 
than 5 percent to woman-owned and small disadvantaged businesses, and not less than 3 
percent to service disabled veteran-owned small businesses and certified Historically 
Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) small businesses (U.S. Small Business 
Association, 2009). 
 AFRC MILCON project procurement is especially targeted for SBA contracting 
venues because the Command’s projects tend to be less complicated and of lower dollar 
value when compared to other DOD workload contracted by the USACE and NAVFAC 
program management contracting offices. 
 Another contracting venue commonly used for AFRC projects is the Multiple 
Award Task Order Contract (MATOC). MATOCs are pools of pre-qualified contractors, 
already under contract to USACE or NAVFAC to deliver broadly specified construction 
services according to specific technical and contractual standards. Each contractor is 
asked to submit a proposal to perform a particular construction project. Typically, each 
MATOC contractor pool is comprised of firms qualifying as small disadvantaged 
businesses or HUBZone contractors as defined by the SBA (Garner, Richardson, and 
Castro-Lacouture, 2008). 
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Chapter Seven - What Constitutes Best Value Contractor Selection? 
 
 Like many other terms, Best Value Selection is used by many people to describe 
many different things. Generally speaking though, the term refers to a type of selection 
process. In the construction industry the decision referred to most often is the choice of 
the design team, the construction team or both. The term best value is commonly used to 
denote a rating procedure in which the final selection criteria include subjective 
considerations and not just a low bid price.  
 How the phrase ―best value‖ is applied can vary depending on what defines 
―value‖. Does value represent the perceived quantity/quality measures of service versus 
the price to provide those services? Is the term ―value‖ applicable to the best design 
solution for a stated budget as is common in some Design-Build selections? Or, is 
―value‖ appropriately used to indicate the qualifications of a firm and its ability to add 
worth by being part of the project team? 
 Once a common understanding of how the expression ―value‖ is being used has 
been established, the next challenge is to determine which firm is ―best.‖ Challenges to 
implementation of best value selections can seem endless. The burden on public sector 
owners to maintain a fair and open election process faces greater scrutiny when using 
methods applying subjective evaluations. The ability to have an entirely objective 
criterion for final selection continues to be the primary advantage that a traditional low 
bid selection process offers over other procurement alternatives. Once a decision is 
reached to include subjective criteria in making a final selection, it is imperative that all 
the parties in the selection process clearly understand those criteria and how they will be 
evaluated and measured. 
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 For decades Federal Government selection procedures for obtaining design 
services has been regulated by the Brooks Act. The selection procedures permitted by this 
Act are completely void of any price element criterion for choosing designers to provide 
these services. Instead, fair compensation is negotiated only with the most technically 
qualified design firm. Thus, selection of architect-engineers has been based on subjective 
criteria for years (Associated General Contractors of America and National Association 
of State Facilities Administrators, 2004). 
  Federal agencies are directed to Section 36 of the FAR for guidance on procuring 
construction services. FAR Section 36.103 – Methods of Contracting states ―the 
contracting officers shall use sealed bid procedures for a construction contract if the 
conditions in 6.401(a) apply.  Section 6.401(a) of the FAR instructs that ―contracting 
officers shall solicit sealed bids if—  
(1) Time permits the solicitation, submission, and evaluation of sealed bids;  
(2) The award will be made on the basis of price and other price-related factors;  
(3) It is not necessary to conduct discussions with the responding offerors about their 
bids; and  
(4) There is a reasonable expectation of receiving more than one sealed bid (FAR 
2005F).  
 Section 6.401(b) specifies that ―Contracting officers may request competitive 
proposals if sealed bids are not appropriate under paragraph (a) of this section (FAR 
2005B). 
 For competitive proposals the FAR allows agencies to use any process or 
combination of processes described in the FAR, such as best value one or two step, or 
performance contracting to procure contracting services (FAR 15.101). According to the 
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regulations, an agency may obtain best value in negotiated acquisitions by using any one 
or a combination of source selection approaches. In different types of acquisitions, the 
relative importance of cost or price may vary. For example, in acquisitions where the 
requirement is clearly defined and the risk of unsuccessful contract performance is 
minimal, cost or price may play a dominant role in source selection. The less definitive 
the requirement, the more development work required, or the greater the performance 
risk, the more technical or past performance considerations may play a dominant role in 
source selection. ―This process permits tradeoffs among cost or price and non-cost factors 
and allows the Government to accept other than the lowest priced proposal. The 
perceived benefits of the higher priced proposal shall merit the additional cost and the 
rationale for tradeoffs must be documented in the file‖ (FAR 2005C; Kashiwagi, Savicky 
and Massner, 2000). 
 The evaluation process for two step procurement is accomplished in two phases. 
The Step One proposals are evaluated only on technical approach and technical 
qualifications, to include: specialized experience and technical competence; capability to 
perform, past performance and other project specific factors deemed important. The Step 
One evaluation process results in a short list of offerors (normally three to five) who then 
are invited to prepare Step Two technical design and cost proposals for final evaluation 
and selection. Examples of Step Two evaluation factors include design concepts, 
management approach, key personnel, and proposed technical solutions. 
 FAR 15.609 provides guidance regarding the competitive range determination for 
Step One contractor selection. Only those firms with a reasonable chance of being 
awarded the project should be asked to submit Step Two cost and technical proposals. 
When determining if a proposal should be included, consideration should be given to the 
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Clarification Requests and Deficiency Reports. The Government submits a clarifications 
request form to a firm when a section of a proposal is not clear enough to enable a fair 
and complete evaluation of the offeror’s capabilities. A deficiency form request is 
submitted to firms whose proposed solution is deemed non-compliant. When there is 
doubt about a firm’s chances of being awarded the project, the Contracting Officer should 
err on the side of including a proposal for Step Two submission.  Oral or written 
discussions with all offerors in the competitive range should be conducted to allow firms 
the opportunity to provide clarifications and correct deficiencies with their proposals. 
Offerors outside the competitive range should be notified promptly – in writing. The 
purpose of this notification is to inform them that they are no longer being considered and 
to prevent them from spending any additional time or money germane to the project 
(FAR 2005C). 
 The Step Two proposal submittal should consist of two volumes: Volume One – 
Preliminary Design Proposal and Volume Two – Cost/Price Proposal and Sub-
Contracting Plan. The Step Two submittal is received and evaluated as in the Step One 
process. However, this step includes the preparation of any required clarification 
requests. Insufficient approach definition, proposal inconsistencies, and inadequate 
substantiation are examples of reasons to generate a clarification request. The Step Two 
technical evaluation report should do the following: 
 Identify offerors whose proposals do not meet the Government’s minimum 
standards as outlined in the RFP. 
 Identify offerors whose proposals do meet the Government’s minimum RFP 
standards. 
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 Identify areas where the offeror may have exceeded the Government’s technical 
standards as outlined in the RFP. 
 Document deficiencies in the RFP itself. 
 Identify clarifications and deficiencies in each offeror’s proposal. 
 Assess risk factors. 
 The technical evaluation report is revised following discussions, the best and final 
offer, and the final technical evaluation. Figures 5 and 6 below summarize Step One and 
Step Two best value contract acquisitions respectively. 
 
  
 Figure 5. Step One Source Selection Process Diagram for Best Value  
 Acquisitions (United States Air Force Project manager’s Guide 2000). 
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Figure 6. Step Two Source Selection Process Diagram for Two-Phase  
Best Value Acquisitions (United States Air Force Project Manager’s Guide 
2000). 
 
 On the federal acquisition community web site the ―seven steps of performance 
based acquisition‖ team of federal departmental acquisition executives affirm  that ―best 
value‖ is a process used to select the most advantageous offer by evaluating and 
comparing elements in addition to cost or price. It allows selection flexibility via 
tradeoffs which the agency makes between cost and non-cost evaluation components with 
the goal of awarding to the contractor providing the Government with the best value for 
the money. The rules for the best value and tradeoff process are twofold: the rules for the 
specific acquisition process being used and the regulations the agency establishes in the 
solicitation. The federal departmental acquisition executive team advises that the 
selection team should include the following features in the evaluation process: 
 Quality and benefits of the solution 
 Quality of the performance metrics and measurement approach 
 Risks associated with the solution 
  31 
 
 Management approach and controls 
 Management team (key personnel) 
 Past performance (how well the contractor has performed) 
 Past experience (what the contractor  has done) 
  The General Accounting Office (GAO) acknowledges broad agency discretion in 
selection. Quite simply, best value source selection involves subjective analysis. It 
cannot, and should not, be reduced to a mechanical, mathematical exercise. The 
following list helps to define the broad discretionary selection latitude available to 
government agencies as envisioned by GAO (Acquisition Central, 2009): 
 Source selection officials have broad discretion to determine the manner and 
extent to which they will make use of the technical and price evaluation results in 
negotiated procurements. 
 In deciding between competing proposals, price/technical tradeoffs may be made; 
the propriety of such tradeoffs turns not on the difference in technical scores or 
ratings per se, but on whether the source selection official’s judgment concerning 
the significance of that difference was reasonable and adequately justified in light 
of the RFP evaluation scheme. 
 The discretion to determine whether the technical advantages associated with a 
higher-priced proposal are worth the price premium exists notwithstanding the 
fact that price is equal to or more important than other factors in the evaluation 
scheme. 
 In a best value procurement, an agency’s selection of a higher-priced, higher-rated 
offer should be supported by a determination that the technical superiority of the 
higher–priced offer warrants the additional cost required. 
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Chapter Eight - Survey of Air Force Reserve Professionals Perceptions and 
Opinions on Best Value Procurement 
 
 A ten question multiple choice questionnaire (See Appendix A, page 75) was 
electronically mailed to USACE, AFRC, and Air Force Center for Engineering and 
Environment (AFCEE) MILCON program managers along with private sector design 
engineers and contractors possessing experience in construction delivery of AFRC 
MILCON projects. Fifty–four of sixty-two delivery professionals polled responded to the 
survey with their opinions regarding just what constitutes best value procurement. Views 
on the applicability, costs, traits, risks, FAR considerations, quality control, personnel 
interviews, and the ability to determine contractor qualifications as they apply to the 
capacity to obtain best value were also requested and recorded. The final question 
pertained to the responder’s amenability to an information environment that allows other 
members of the project team to dictate the amount of information and control they need.  
 Each question along with a corresponding pie chart summarizing the resultant 
responses follows. Below each chart are the author’s comments on the feedback received 
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Figure 7. Survey Question No. 1: Definition of Best Value Procurement 
     
A) The contractor representing the best value is the one meeting the minimally 
acceptable qualification evaluation factors and proposing the lowest price. 
B) The contractor having the best qualifications and who offers a price within the 
project’s budget (programming amount) is the best value. 
C) The best value contractor is the one with acceptable past performance and 
offering the lowest price. 
D) The best value contractor is the one whose qualifications, including past 
performance, technical ability and experience when combined with price provides 
the best opportunity for successful execution at the least risk. 
E) None of the above. Please write your own definition of best value in terms of 
military procurement. 
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 According to Figure 7, the survey participant responses to this question revealed a 
basic understanding of best value procurement of construction services by a large number 
of AFRC project delivery professionals. Some additional definitions chosen by those 
selecting (E) None of the above were:   
1.  ―Best value is a balance of lowest technically qualified price and demonstrable 
project understanding and proposal clarifications which represent the lowest risk 
to the buyer‖ (a construction contractor’s definition).   
2. ―The contractor who provides the best mix of qualifications, design intent and 
price which gives the government the best project for the price.‖ 
3. ―The contractor having the best qualifications and who offers the best technical 
proposal for the best price within the project’s budget.‖ 
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A.)  Design-Build    D.)  A and B above 
B.)  Design-Bid-Build   E.)  B and C above 
C.)  Construction Management at-Risk F.)  All of the above 
 
 Figure 8 presents evidence that a slight majority of AFRC project delivery 
professionals are aware that best value can be applied to three of today’s most common 
delivery methods. Construction Management at-Risk is a method not used in military 
procurement because of FAR restrictions. Design-Build is still seen as an innovative 
approach to project delivery compared to the traditional Design-Bid-Build delivery and is 
sometimes seen as the method available for attempting non-conventional approaches to 
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A.) True   B.)  False     C.)  Not sure 
 Actually to receive greater construction performance and value the reverse of the 
statement above is true. Best value delivers the best performance at the lowest cost. 
Figure 9 divulges that eight of every ten AFRC project delivery professionals agree with 
this attribute of best value procurement. 
 
 
Figure 10. Survey Question No. 4: Traits of Best Value Procurement 
 
 
A.) Trust between the contractor and owner/client is required. 
B.) The construction industry controls the quality of construction. 
C.) Best value is a selection process. 
D.) Partnering is a valuable tool in resolving issues. 
E.) All of the above. 
F.) None of the above. 
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 This is perhaps a trick question since none of the statements are true but represent 
false perceptions of best value. The fact that none of the project delivery professionals 
recognized this, as demonstrated by Figure 10, provides strong evidence of a lack of 
knowledge regarding true best value principles in the AFRC construction community.   
  The quality gap in performance between owner and contractor objectives (See 
Figure 4, page 17) has resulted in conflicts and disputes, poor collaboration and a deficit 
in customer focus and involvement in the project delivery process. These input and 
deficiency factors lead directly to outcome inefficiencies such as time and cost overruns, 
and low productivity, poor quality and customer satisfaction. Generally, increased 
collaboration between project actors is argued to be a suitable antidote for many of the 
industry’s problems. Partnering aims to increase cooperation and integration between the 
players by building trust and commitment while decreasing disputes (Eriksson, Nilsson 
and Atkin, 2008).  
 The present USACE approach to partnering represents a reactive course. 
Partnering sessions focus on teambuilding and defining the resolution process and roles 
of the individual team members when problems/issues arise. A much more effective line 
is to make anticipation and management of risks associated with a project key aspects of 
partnering. The subject should be introduced during the first partnering meeting, 
encouraging participants to draw upon their past experiences and technical expertise to 
pool their perceptions of project-related risks to the achievement of project goals. 
Partnering as a risk management process should include the following standard 
component parts (Manley, Shaw, and Manley, 2007): 
1. Risk Identification: Which risks are likely to affect the project and what are the 
characteristic elements of risk. 
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2. Risk Qualification: Evaluate the various risks and their impacts upon possible 
project outcomes. 
3. Risk Response Development: Steps for opportunities and responses to anticipated 
risks. 
4. Risk Response Monitoring and Control: Structure a process that will respond to 
changes in risks over the course of the project. 
Only one of every ten professionals regards partnering as a valuable tool for resolving 
conflicts and a beneficial construction industry best practice. Failure to incorporate 




Figure 11. Survey Question No. 5: Risks 
 
 
A.) Contractor  B.)  Government C.)  Both in a partnering session 
 In a true best value procurement this responsibility should be delegated to the 
contractor and not shared jointly by the owner and the contractor as Figure 11 proposes. 
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By coercing the contractor to minimize the risk they do not control, it forces the best 
value contractor to: 
1. Take control of the project. 
2. Preplan. 
3. Minimize all of the risks. 
4. Identify and document the risks if they cannot be minimized. 
 If the owner wants to partner, it is accepting the liability. A party is never at risk 
when they do not have the accountability, regardless of what is perceived. The owner 
may send its highly trained personnel to the partnering meeting. The contractor, on the 
other hand, will send only its medium trained personnel. Only when a party has liability 
and risk will it engage its most experienced and skilled people in these sessions. If the 
contractor has complete control over the project, it will employ its best trained people to 
identify problems and plan solutions to most efficiently use resources (Kashiwagi, 2002).  
 The responders’ low opinion of partnering in Figure 10 (See page 36) does not 
appear to have persisted in their responses summarized in Figure 11. Perhaps the 
conviction of the majority, that risk identification and minimization are within the ambit 
of partnering sessions, provides tacit affirmation of a preponderant attitude that risk 











Figure 12. Survey Question No. 6: FAR Considerations 
 




 Figure 12 affirms that delivery professional opinions regarding whether numerical 
ratings may be used to evaluate contractors’ past performance varies widely. This is not 
unexpected since both FAR and the USACE Army Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement (AFARS) guidance is confusing and difficult to interpret. According to Jim 
Whalen, Defense Acquisition University, ―You are free to use numerical ratings to 
distinguish between the ―Non-Price‖ factors (technical, past performance, management 
plan, etc.). What you cannot do is express a numerical relationship between ―Price‖ vs. 
―Non-Price.‖ You can only use the three statements of relative importance found at FAR 
15.101-1(b) (2). These are: ―whether all evaluation factors other than cost or price, when 
combined, are significantly more important than, approximately equal to, or significantly 
less important than cost or price.‖  Nonetheless, most people agree that numerical rating 
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is not a best practice in Government source selection. The ―color‖ (Blue, Green, Yellow, 
and Red) coding system seemed to work best over the years.‖ 
 Mr. Whalen further explains that ―First you need to be clear that there are two 
percentage ―ratings‖ going on - the relative importance between price (all by itself) as 
compared to all of the non-price factors together. Then you prioritize the non-price 
factors on one side of the ―scale‖ by their relative importance, for example: past 
performance 50% + technical 20% +  quality 20% + management  plan 10% = 100%. On 
the other side we have the price factor. The number of non-price factors can vary from 
one procurement package to another. However, the weights assigned to each non-price 
factor must total 100%. ….This allows the Source Selection Authority some latitude in 
the weighting process without having to amend the solicitation. This way contractors 
cannot determine the overall weight of ANY factor (Price or Non-Price) since they do not 
know the weighting of Price vs. Non-Price. The only clue we give them is the statement 
of relative importance [FAR 15.101-1(b) (2)]‖ (Whalen, 2002). 
 An AFRC Contracting Division executive, when asked about the use of numerical 
rating systems for past contractor performance had this to say: ―Color coding is an Air 
Force mandatory procedure. Use of numerical versus color or adjectival ratings makes it 
very difficult at times to draw a clear line between winning proposals and those that are 
not. ….Contractors spend hundreds of thousands of dollars putting together proposals, if 
they could lose by a subjective point here or there…….‖ (Sharpe, 2009). The implication 
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Figure 13. Survey Question No. 7: Best Value and Quality Control 
 
 
A.) True B.)  False   C.)  Not sure 
 
 
 Figure 13 demonstrates that AFRC project delivery professional realize that the 
QC plan is not a tool used to control contractor personnel. The Quality Control (QC) Plan 
in the best value environment should minimize risks that the contractor does not control. 
If a risk still occurs after the contractor has done everything it can possibly do, the client 
and not the contractor should be responsible for the risk. The QC Plan is the contractor’s 
plan to control the project. It does not have to control its own people; the contractor’s 
personnel should know how to do their jobs. However, the contractor does need to tell 
everyone else how the project risks (which it doesn’t control) will be minimized. The QC 
Plan should clearly explain how the contractor wants to see the risks handled. Contractors 
who don’t know what they want done, put themselves in a precarious position 
(Kashiwagi, 2002).  
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Figure 14. Survey Question No. 8: Interviews with Key Personnel 
 
 
A.) True B.)  False    C.)  Not sure 
 
 
 Contractor interviews provide the most information in the best value project 
delivery process. According to Figure 14, a majority of AFRC delivery professionals 
agree that contractor interviews add significant value to the selection process. They 
should not be the traditional ―marketing and sales‖ interview with senior officers but 
rather an in-depth look at the site superintendent, project manager or other key/critical 
personnel and their understanding of risk and risk minimization, experience with like 
projects, and measure of their perception and ability to predict the future outcome. If the 
project results in nonperformance, the interviewees should be held accountable.  
 When individual ratings for past projects are signed and made available for 
consideration as part of the past performance evaluation in the contractor selection 
process, the value of these interviews increases significantly. Absent this accountability, 
the interviews have limited value. Military construction procurement has no mechanism 
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in place to hold key contractor personnel personally responsible for prior project 
performance. Figure 14 reveals that less than a third of the survey responders consider the 
statement that interviews add significant value to be false while an additional 17% are 
unsure and perhaps don’t know (Kashiwagi, 2002).  
 
 
Figure 15.  Survey Question No. 9: Contractor's Ability, Capacity, and Experience 
  
 
A.) True B.)  False  C.)  Not sure 
 
 
 Figure 15 illustrates that almost half of those answering the survey agree that it is 
difficult to determine contractor ability, capacity, and experience and that the process is 
subjective. A possible reason for this high percentage response is that present Federal 
Government past performance databases and models provide no means to objectively use 
this information. Consequently, this historical material is primarily used to assess 
whether contractors meet arbitrary minimum standards for past performance, i.e. no 
unsatisfactory ratings on previous work. Contractor scores for attributes pertaining to the 
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ability to provide best value are forced into subjective models. This allows the Source 
Selection Authority (SSA) some latitude in the weighting process without having to 
amend the solicitation and precludes the use of specific numerical numbers which are 
often perceived to be arbitrarily assigned (see earlier comments on FAR Considerations 
survey query). This past performance evaluation process reduces the propensity for bid 
protests (Sharpe, 2009). 
 Federal procurement seeks to command the procurement process using 
regulations as a means to direct (Type C organization – see Chapter 4: Information 
Theory and Figure 2 ―Decision Making‖). When the owner exercises control, the 
following related conditions also exist (Kashiwagi, Savicky, Massner, 2002): 
1. Detailed means and methods for direction. 
2. Increased subjective decision-making. 
3. A need to manage and direct the participants in the process. 
4. Attracts contractors that need management and direction. 
5. Poor construction performance results. 
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Figure 16. Survey Question No. 10: Information Management 
 
 
A.)  Agree B.)  Disagree    C.)  Not sure     D.)  What are you talking about? 
 
  
 Based on the information provided by Figure 16, a majority of the survey 
respondents do not appear to appreciate Peter Drucker’s information management 
theories and their application in delivering value to the customer. Drucker believed many 
executives have business problems because they are poorly informed about the 
fundamentals of the business’s performance and don’t really know how to interpret 
business information. Appropriate information must be gathered and properly interpreted 
and used according to Drucker. 
 In establishing an adequate information system, project delivery professionals 
must include information that coerces them to continually question previous assumptions. 
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This drives continuous improvement of business processes essential to increasing value 
and remaining competitive in a dynamic and changing business environment (Watson, 
2002). 
 Someone with a high degree of information allows the people with whom he or 
she is working to dictate the level of information and control they need. This is the action 
of a facilitator. The facilitator passes along only as much information as the people who 
are being coordinated feel comfortable with. The facilitator distributes more information 
to those who are faster at processing, and less to those who are slower. While a controller 
tries to dominate, manipulate and control everyone, a facilitator treats everyone 
differently based on each person’s capability to perceive and use information. A 
facilitator rarely makes someone feel uncomfortable (Kashiwagi, 2002).  
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Chapter Nine 
AFRC Performance in MILCON Project Delivery 1992 – 2007 
 
 MILCON construction project performance data was obtained from the Air 
Force’s Automated Civil Engineering System (ACES) database. Inputs to this database 
are supplied by Air Force Reserve Command field program engineers and by 
Headquarters staff MILCON project managers. Estimated and actual execution milestone 
performance dates and project cost statistics during both design and construction are 
regularly logged, inspected, and confirmed during the entire project delivery process. In 
preparation for briefings to AFRC higher management, project managers produce status 
reports derived from this information. These reports provide the groundwork for 
decisions regarding future project execution strategies and may precipitate permutations 
to existing delivery schemes. One hundred forty seven AFRC MILCON projects in 
program years 1992 through 2007 were drawn from the database, compiled into reports 
and analyzed. Figure 17 shows calculated average construction cost and schedule growth 
for three annual AFRC MILCON program periods since 1992. Base upon the results 
graphically shown in this figure, AFRC has experienced significant problems supplying 

























Figure 17. AFRC MILCON Program Construction Cost & Schedule Growth  
(Air Force ACES 2009). 
 
   
Actual project completions are approaching 50% schedule growth when measured against 
contractually specified construction performance periods. Conversely, construction cost 
growth has shown a significant decrease over the sixteen year period of analyzed project 
performance. However, this optimistic cost growth trend is dampened considerably by 
the large number of projects awarded above budget causing any change order costs to be 
a major execution issue (See Figure 1/Chapter 1). Additional funding for individual 
project budget overruns can only come from savings realized from other projects within 
the congressionally appropriated program.  
 Informal discussions about these construction cost and schedule growth 
discoveries with various AFRC project management professionals disclosed the 
following opinions regarding explanations for this performance metric trend: 
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1. The proclivity of AFRC to trade ―time for dollars‖ when resolving contract issues 
that arise during construction. Contractors receive relief consideration from 
unauthorized delay claims in exchange for controlling contract cost growth. 
2. Increasing propensity for customer involvement in construction management 
discussions/decisions including the inclination to add additional requirements. 
3. Failure to identify and plan for potential unanticipated risks before they occur. 
4. Failure to properly plan and coordinate construction material deliveries and work 
activities particularly those along the schedule’s critical path. 
5. Construction schedules subjectively established based only upon the size of the 
project’s budget without regard for the work complexity, availability and skill 
level of the construction workforce, site location characteristics, and other 
project specific factors influencing the time required to construct.  
When interviewed in February 2009, the USACE head of program management for the 
AFRC MILCON program stated that prior to 2003 all AFRC MILCON projects used 
price as the sole selection criterion, provided the contractor met minimal qualifications 
for bidding on AFRC projects (Ringenberg, 2009). These minimum qualifications 
typically include proof of approved wage rate payments, appropriate subcontractor 
selection criteria for federal contracts, adequate bonding capacity and adherence to 
federally mandated requirements for minority group participation in the project. The 
USACE program management chief went on to say that beginning in 2003 to the present 
a radical shift to FAR Part 15.101 best value procedures as interpreted by USACE 
MILCON project contracting officers was implemented. Contractor selection criteria for 
projects in years 2003 through 2007 included both price and non-price factors 
(Ringenberg, 2009). Figure 18 shows the lack of positive impact that USACE’s concept 
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Figure 18. AFRC MILCON Program Solicitation Method Comparison 
(Air Force ACES 2009). 
 
 The average number of construction modifications per project per fiscal year for 
the sixteen year time period was also gleaned from the ACES database. Analysis of this 
data and discussions with ACES database administrators spawned speculation that a 
significant number of modifications were not posted by project managers in ACES. 
Nevertheless the following chart (Figure 19) demonstrates that AFRC, both before and 
after implementation of FAR 15 best value negotiations procedures, continues to be 
plagued with unexpected changes during MILCON construction that adversely affect 
project costs and schedules. 
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Figure 19. Average Number of Changes per Construction Contract  
(Air Force ACES 2009). 
 
 
 For the last sixteen years the AFRC MILCON construction industry has 
overwhelmingly demonstrated the characteristics of only three of the four quadrants of 
the CIS model (See Figure 20) for describing competition and performance in the project 
delivery environment (Kashiwagi, 2002): 
 
















Figure 20.   The Construction Industry Structure (CIS) model




















 Quadrant I – use of the Design-Bid-Build delivery method to award contracts to 
the lowest bidding construction contractor. 
 Quadrant II – not used. 
 Quadrant III – use of SBA contracting venues such as MATOC and HUBZone in 
which pre-qualified contractors are subjectively selected as the best value using 
minimal performance standards in a limited bid competitive environment. 
 Quadrant IV – use of sole source minority owned construction firms that deliver 
less performance for a higher price. There is no real competition because true 
performers are prevented from participation.  
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Chapter Ten 
Air Force Reserve Command Difficulties in Moving to Best Value Project Delivery 
 
 Best value procurement was injected into the federal project acquisition process 
via regulatory and legislative initiatives. The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 authorized 
Design-Build procurement, described the two phase selection process (See Figure 6), and 
provided a procedure for using best value procurement (Heisse, 2002).  Mentioned 
previously in Chapter Seven, FAR 15.101 is the regulatory vehicle intended to provide 
guidance to federal agencies in legally consummating best value contracts. Clearly 
defined requirements are inherently encouraged and it behooves the requiring agency to 
identify and reduce or, better yet, eliminate risks if possible prior to actual solicitation. 
The quickest, simplest, and least controversial procurement process is to let price play the 
dominant role in source selection. The propensity to treat procurement of facility 
construction services in a manner analogous to the purchase of manufactured goods is 
apparent. For construction acquisitions with poorly defined requirements, the acquisition 
strategy language in the FAR can appear abstruse. The following FAR 15.101-1(c) 
phase,‖ the perceived benefits of the higher priced proposal shall merit the additional 
cost, and the rational for tradeoffs must be documented in the file…‖ causes considerable 
consternation among the contracting office cadre of the various governmental agencies. 
This recondite phase has been the agent for driving many construction procurements to 
the price only selection criterion. Even when requirements are murky and proposals 
provide various alternative scenarios for satisfying them, it can be incredibly difficult to 
justify more expensive, but technically superior, offers when the rational is subject the 
perceived astringent review of GAO auditors.  
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 Although the FAR allows federal agency procurement offices to use any variation 
of performance contracting or best value procurement, the various federal agencies in 
general and the two authorized AFRC procurement agencies, USACE and NAVFAC, in 
particular have been slow to implement genuine best value selection techniques. There is 
much skepticism within the ranks of AFRC project delivery professionals and senior 
management regarding the legality and prudency of allowing the contractor to control its 
construction projects. Moreover, many within the AFRC project delivery community are 
unaware of any available mechanism that permits construction award based on 
performance and price while also motivating the contractor to produce and continuously 
improve. 
 A major obstacle to incentivizing contractor performance and continuous 
improvement is the Federal Government’s procedure for appraisement of contractor past 
performance. There are several databases used to access past performance. These various 
records apply assorted performance metrics and subjective ratings that present serious 
challenges to the ability to make meaningful decisions regarding contractor experience on 
prior government projects.  By far the most common performance database used for 
AFRC solicitations is the Army Corps of Engineers Construction Contract Appraisal 
Support System (CCASS). Contractors, under consideration with no previous USACE 
construction project experience, submit their own past performance information including 
references. The deficiencies of the CCASS system and the contractor’s own submission 
include:  
1. No method to use contractor submitted information or past performance numbers 
except to affirm that minimum standards are met. 
2. Ratings are adjectival and subjective. 
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3. No method to maintain a useable performance number on a contractor once they 
have done work. 
4. No method to use past performance numbers to give credit for high performance 
in the award of a construction project. 
 The CCASS and contractor submitted past project work performance assessments 
and narratives become information or descriptive ratings used merely to verify that the 
contractor meets minimum selection standards. This past performance evaluation tool 
encourages the use of low-price award. This is the Quadrant I environment that has led to 
poor construction performance, failure to deliver projects on time, and construction 
delivery costs above budget. 
 AFRC, USACE and NAVFAC’s current structure for best value contracting is 
very subjective and has no method to (Kashiwagi, Savicky, Massner, 2002): 
1. Factor in past performance. 
2. Factor in the capability to identify and minimize risk and value engineer in non-
technical terms. 
3. Move the risk of nonperformance to the contractor minimizing cost increasing 
change orders. 
4. Factor performance on the project directly into the contractor’s future rating and 
competitive nature. 
 Federal agencies like USACE and NAVFAC maintain huge databases of difficult 
to use information. The value of this information is diminished because much of it is 
based upon idiosyncratic past performance interpretations by a myriad of government 
project management personnel. The selection board, with contracting officer oversight, 
discretionarily decides the degree of influence this performance information will have on 
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the final selection decision. Whenever there is subjective decision making, the direction 
of awards is always toward the Quadrant I environment and the low bid. This can be seen 
by analysis of Figure 2 ―Decision –Information Relationship‖: 
1. A lack of information leads to decision-making. 
2. Decision-making is only done when information is lacking. If information is 
readily available, everyone will agree, and decision-making is not needed. 
3. When information is lacking, risk is high. 
4. Decision-making brings risk. 
5. A lack of information will make alternatives look alike. 
6. When alternatives look alike, the best value is the lowest price. 
7. The lowest price brings the highest risk. 
 Instead of supporting the procurement of value these federal agencies are merely 
procuring commodities. To successfully procure value they must (Kashiwagi, 2002): 
1. Minimize decision-making. 
2. Release control and direction of the contractor (a tall order indeed!) 
3. Help measure performance using relative numbers. 
 




AFRC Military Transformation Project Delivery 
 
 AFRC’s fiscal year 2007 MILCON program included construction of an 
approximately 50,000 square foot administrative facility at a military installation in the 
United States Midwest.  A team project acquisition strategy meeting, consisting of project 
and program managers representing both AFRC and USACE, along with USACE and 
SBA contracting personnel, was conducted in October 2005. The team’s decision was to 
employ Design-Build project delivery requesting competitive proposals from HUBZone 
contractors as the solicitation vehicle. Request For Proposal bridging documents, 
comprised of a conceptual design with primarily prescriptive specifications, were 
developed by a private design firm and completed in November 2006. Preliminary soil 
borings and the subsequent soils report prepared for inclusion in the RFP revealed 
potentially unsuitable soils for specifying a standard spread footing building foundation. 
The RFP design firm postulated a mat foundation system could work and was confident 
that an expensive concrete pile foundation system would structurally support the facility. 
However, additional geotechnical and engineering work would be required to definitively 
specify the proper foundation system for the facility. The engineering firm’s 
recommendation was to specify the use of a piling foundation system (worst case 
scenario) in the RFP and invite the chosen contractor, after award, to offer alternative 
foundation designs. The primary disadvantage of this approach would be receipt of more 
costly (possibly budget busting) proposals for the expensive piling foundation. An 
additional concern was the inability to realize competitive savings for technically 
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adequate and less expensive alternative foundations after contract award should 
additional soils testing provide confirmation.  
 Since the 2007 appropriations fiscal year was nearing the beginning of the second 
quarter (January 2007), considerably political pressure was being applied to the project 
delivery team to advertise and award the project as expeditiously as possible.  
Congressionally appropriated MILCON projects awarded after the year of apportionment 
receive lots of negative attention in Department of the Air Force Program Management 
Reviews (PMR’s).  
 The AFRC project manager’s initial suggestion was to convert the project 
delivery method from Design-Build to Design-Bid-Build and requisition a complete 
design prior to construction solicitation. This strategy would insure adequate time to fully 
investigate the soil conditions and specify a foundation system sufficient to satisfy 
structural load requirements. Unfortunately, neither design dollars nor time were 
available to implement this strategy.  
 The next delivery tactic proposed by the AFRC project manager was to convert 
the Design-Build RFP schema from a hard bid proposal to a solutions -based best value 
procurement. Contractors would be given the project budget with instructions to submit 
technical proposals and prices within the funds available. This project pricing mechanism 
was a modification of the Guaranteed Maximum Price (GMP) format where the owner 
agrees to reimburse the cost of the work up to a prescribed ceiling amount. In this case 
proposals submitted above the stated budget would be unacceptable, however, the 
selected contractor would not be asked to hold its price for the duration of the contract if 
circumstances arose that justified price increases. Contractors would have the opportunity 
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and the presumed incentive to recommend the best solution within the project financial 
budget in order to receive the contract. 
 USACE project delivery team members then offered to convert the Design-Build 
RFP to a USACE Contracting Office approved best value format called Military 
Transformation. Bidders would be provided a specified project construction cost limit 
and given the opportunity to provide the best value for the funds available. The maximum 
price or budget for the project had already been established by congressional 
authorization; however the project team had no assurance that the facility could be 
constructed for the funds available given the unexpected soil conditions. The Military 
Transformation approach would encourage innovation, cost saving ideas, and proffered 
opportunities for maximizing the scope and project quality in an attempt to supply an 
acceptable proposal within the funds authorized. The existing RFP would have to be 
modified, removing many prescriptive project requirements and replacing them with 
performance specifications. The revised RFP would permit the contractor to select how 
and with what materials and finishes the building would be constructed. 
 When presented with the Military Transformation procurement proposal, the Air 
Force end-user customers (the military installation project manager and occupants of the 
facility) were unwilling to give the contractor this much latitude in the choice of the 
facility’s materials and finishes. The project delivery team decided to pursue a ―modified 
Military Transformation‖ solicitation allowing the contractor limited freedom to choose 
building components with certain features restricted by prescriptive specifications solely 
specified by the Government and ―off-limits‖ to innovative and cost-saving alternatives. 
 A March 2007 project team conference established the ground rules for revising 
the existing RFP for this modified Military Transformation acquisition.  The solicitation 
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would include a ―president’s clause‖ requiring the contractors to identify all deviations 
included in their proposals that did not conform to the contract document requirements. 
The inclusion of this clause was not an attempt to force the contractors to identify and 
mitigate risks to the project but simply an instrument making it easier to flag items in the 
various proposals not meeting either the performance or prescriptive specifications of the 
modified Military Transformation solicitation. These items could then be considered for 
acceptance in evaluation of the aptness of the overall proposal, within the funds available, 
to substantially meet the project’s ultimate goals. The project team member representing 
the Midwest military installation, site of the proposed new facility, demanded inclusion 
of non-negotiable building elevations in the revised RFP. The reason cited for this 
stipulation was to ensure that the final product would conform to the installation’s 
architectural standards.  The RFP documents would include the following: 
 Site Plan 
 Floor Plans 
 Exterior Elevations 
 Site Utility Plans 
 Geotechnical Report 
The solicitation would remain restricted to HUBZone contractors in a competitive bid 
environment as decided in the October 2005 acquisition strategy meeting. 
 A Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB), comprised of USACE and AFRC 
technical project management personnel under USACE contracting and legal counsel 
guidance, was established and the revised RFP was issued for contractor consideration in 
November 2007. The due date for proposals had to be extended because a conflict arose 
regarding the wording used to state the construction cost limit in the solicitation. The 
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AFRC project manager wanted the verbiage to clearly state that offers received with cost 
proposal above this maximum price would not be acceptable. The manager’s objective in 
making this request was not to require contractors to provide a GMP. This pricing 
mechanism has the perception of being unfair to contractors in USACE contracting and 
legal counsel circles and is only used when contractors participate in development of the 
RFP prior to contract award. In stating the construction cost limit, USACE contracting 
personnel did not want to misrepresent to the contractors the final amount of money that 
might be made available to award a contract as AFRC mission priorities might change. 
They wished to add the phase ―The Government cannot guarantee that additional funds 
can be made available for award‖ (Gee, 2007).  The AFRC project manager’s argument 
was that if the contractors knew there was a possibility that the Government might 
receive additional funds for the project, there would be less incentive to provide 
innovative alternatives to keep the price of the work within the known available 
construction funds. The difference was settled by inclusion of the following sentence in 
the General Conditions specifications section of the RFP solicitation regarding cost: 
―The cost limitation for contract award is $_______ based on funds made available for 
this project. The Government cannot guarantee that additional funds can be made 
available for award. Offerors are under no obligation to approach this ceiling.‖ 
 The source selection process was a one step best value acquisition (See Figure 5). 
The HUBZone contractors were asked to submit both technical (non-price) and price 
proposals in a single submittal package. The SSEB convened in April 2008 and evaluated 
each proposal to ensure non-price factors conformed to General Conditions requirements. 
The Board determined technical proposal consensus ratings for each factor. A cost 
analysis for each price proposal was also accomplished. The proposals were reviewed for 
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unbalanced pricing information, realism, and reasonableness. This review consisted of a 
comparison of the various proposals with each other and with the governmental non-
disclosed RFP cost estimate, prepared and updated prior to solicitation. Upon completion 
of both the technical and price evaluations, the SSEB continued to evaluate its findings. 
A comparative analysis of all acceptable offers was conducted encompassing a 
cost/technical trade-off with the goal of choosing and recommending for selection the 
offeror representing the best value to the Government. 
 The non-price selection criteria required to be submitted by each contractor in its 
technical proposal consisted of the following: 
Experience 
 Prime contractor experience constructing up to five projects of similar size, scope 
and dollar value. 
 Design team experience providing design services for up to five projects of 
similar size, scope and dollar value. 
Past Performance 
 Prime contractor (general contractor) past performance on the construction 
experience cited above including references, letters, awards and ratings such as 
CCASS. Only documentation of satisfactory performance on similar projects 
would render sufficient evidence that proposals met the minimum RFP 
requirements for this criterion. 
 Design team past performance on the construction experience cited above 
including references, letters, awards and ratings such as CCASS. Only 
documentation of satisfactory performance on similar projects rendered sufficient 
evidence that proposals met the minimum RFP requirements for this criterion. 
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 Past performance on utilization of small, small disadvantaged, and women-owned 
small businesses. 
Technical Proposal Information 
 Color renderings demonstrating that the proposal complied with overall 
appearance and functionality requirements of the RFP including compliance with 
the military installation’s architectural compatibility plan intended to provide 
assurance that the new building would blend with the architectural features of 
existing buildings in the locale. 
 Design drawings that provided evidence the proposal was in compliance with 
applicable codes and that building materials and finishes were of sufficient quality 
to meet the RFP performance and prescriptive requirements. 
 A design narrative exhibiting a complete understanding of the project 
requirements as stated in the RFP Statement of Work. The narrative should also 
include any improvements and betterments exceeding the requirements of the 
RFP including an explanation of proposed building systems. 
The project delivery teams’ intent was for the contractors, in their design narratives, to 
include proposed solutions to the building foundation issue made apparent by the 
preliminary soil borings report.  
Subcontracting Narrative 
 This technical proposal criterion insured that the contractors met United States 
Small Business requirements for subcontractor participation by Veteran-Owned, 
HUBZone, Small Disadvantaged Businesses and Women-Owned Small 
Businesses. Rating for each contractor on this factor was accomplished solely on 
a ―go, no-go‖ basis. 
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Management 
 A management plan describing how the contractors’ labor, resources, designers, 
subcontractors and material suppliers would be coordinated and used to ensure 
successful completion of the project. This plan required a narrative detailing how 
and by whom the contractor would provide management, supervision, and 
coordination of subcontractors’ work. An organizational chart showing home 
office support, on-site management, and the responsible chain of command was 
also required. This chart had to include the designated Quality Control and Safety 
Officers along with a brief description of their qualifications/experience. Plans not 
demonstrating a clear understanding of the work or capacity to coordinate 
resources were not considered to have met the RFP requirements. Furthermore, 
organizational charts that were confusing and cluttered with duplicate entries or 
not clearly defining responsibilities were also deemed to not meet provisions of 
the RFP. This Military Transformation management plan emphasized the listing 
of specific personnel and their qualifications along with a vague narrative 
requirement explaining how the contractor would ―manage‖ the project. 
Practically any submission naming people with apparent legitimate prior 
experience along with a general description of their construction project 
management work would suffice. In fact, contractors have been known to submit 
the same management plan for several AFRC projects with only slight 
modifications in a meager attempt to make it project specific.   
 Neither the technical proposal information nor the management plan submittals 
included a requirement for the contractor to identify risks that it did not control or a 
proviso to explain how it would mitigate risks to the project. Failure to include these 
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requirements relieved the contractor from accountability for these risks and placed the 
responsibility and consequences for risks completely on USACE as the project 
management agency and AFRC, the fiscally responsible owner. This deficiency in the 
proposal requirements meant that project control would always remain with the 
Government and that the successful contractor would always act in its own best interest 
and not the owner’s. 
 The SSEB was directed to consider and individually rate all technical proposal 
factors for each contractor. The individual evaluator analyses were to be discussed by 
Board members and assimilated into a single consensus evaluation of each factor and any 
sub factors summarized in concise written commentaries on consolidated comment 
sheets. The evaluators were instructed not to vote or average individual ratings. Once 
concurrent comments were developed for all proposals, the Board was instructed to 
establish final ratings for each criterion based on the group’s consensus opinions. The 
ratings were to include assessment of overall proposal risks. For all criteria except 
subcontractor narrative, factors and sub factors were to be rated using the following 
adjectival-based system:  
 Outstanding 
o The proposal has exceptional merit and reflects an excellent approach 
which will clearly result in the superior attainment of all requirements and 
objectives. Proposal risk level is very low. 
 Good 
o The proposal demonstrates a sound approach expected to fully meet all 
requirements and objectives. The proposal risk level is low. 
 Acceptable 
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o The proposal demonstrates an approach which is capable of meeting all 
requirements and objectives, with no advantages or disadvantages. The 
proposal risk level is moderate. 
 Marginal 
o The proposal demonstrates an approach which may not be capable of 
meeting all requirements and objectives. The proposal risk level is high. 
 Unacceptable 
o The proposal contains major errors, omissions, or deficiencies that 
indicate a complete lack of understanding of the requirements or it 
contains an approach that cannot be expected to meet the requirements or 
involves a very high risk. The proposal risk is very high. 
 Based upon gathered past performance information, the SSEB was instructed to 
complete a contractor performance risk assessment sheet on all offerors using the 
following rating bands metrics (Gee, 2008): 
 Low Risk 
o Essentially no doubt exists that the offeror will successfully perform the 
required effort based on its performance record. 
 Moderate Risk 
o Some doubt exists that the offeror will successfully perform the required 
effort based on their performance record. 
 High Risk 
o Significant doubt exists that the offeror will successfully perform the 
required effort based on their performance record. 
 Unknown Risk 
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o Little or no relevant performance record is identifiable upon which to base 
a meaningful performance risk prediction.  This equates to an unknown 
past performance risk assessment, having no positive or negative 
evaluation significance. 
 Equipped with a thorough understanding of the ratings language for technical 
adequacy and performance risk, the SSEB arrived at consensus rankings of these 
components for the various contractor proposals. Board members were then allowed to 
view contractor price proposals submitted in separate sealed envelopes. A trade off 
analysis of competing proposals was conducted. Past performance and design narrative 
rankings when compared with price proposals convinced members of the Board that the 
low price proposal did not represent the least risk to the Government both in terms of 
performance or the tendered building foundation system. In fact the lowest priced offeror, 
unlike others, submitted a standard spread footings foundation in its proposal and did not 
offer an alternative for an improved building foundation system. The implication was 
clear to Board members that, by accepting this proposal, the Government was assuming 
all cost risks if further geotechnical investigations disclosed that soil conditions at the site 
rendered this foundation system inadequate to meet the building’s structural support 
requirements. A change order would be required to install a different and more expensive 
foundation system if additional soils reports mandated the requirement. 
 Discussions with USACE contracting personnel ensued.  SSEB criteria state that 
the Source Selection Authority (SSA) is the contracting officer. The chairperson of the 
SSEB is a contracting specialist while the Board members serve as technical advisors. 
The SSA has the final decision regarding contractor selection. The decision must be 
consistent with the evaluation factors and the source selection process, however beyond 
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this; the SSA has broad discretion in making the source selection decision. The SSA is 
not bound by the SSEB’s evaluation findings and may require the Board to re-evaluate or 
re-analyze to aid the SSA’s basis for a differing opinion. 
 The Source Selection Decision Document (SSDD) is intended to fully justify the 
SSA’s decision. It should address the rationale for the business judgments and tradeoffs, 
and focus on key proposal differences and specific tradeoffs that led to the decision.  If 
the SSA determines that the best value proposal is other than the lowest-priced proposal, 
the SSDD must explicitly justify paying a price premium, clearly stating what benefits or 
advantages the Government is receiving for the added price and why it is in the 
Government's best interest to expend the additional funds.   
 In this case study the SSA agreed with the SSEB that the low price offeror did not 
provide the least risk to the Government both in performance as well as technical risks. 
However, quantifying the additional risks imposed on the Government by the low priced 
contractor into a monetary amount supportable by a GAO audit appeared to be an 
impossible task. Unsuccessful contractors can file bid protests triggering such an audit up 
to 10 days after award of the construction contract. The SSA’s final decision was to select 
the contractor submitting the lowest priced offer. In this case, instead of procuring true 
best value construction services for this MILCON project, the Government and AFRC 
instead consummated a contract based upon minimum requirements qualifications and 
the lowest price offer. The old traditional ―tried and true‖ method of contractor selection, 
based upon previous FAR interpretations and source selection experience, was imposed 
on this attempt to inject best value criteria into the AFRC MILCON procurement process 
(Yates, 2008).  
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Chapter Twelve 
A Comparison of True Best Value and Military Transformation  
 
 The  following (Table 1) is a comparison of the AFRC case study modified 
Military Transformation best value format, applied in the case study, and a true best value 
delivery process such as PIPS (See Appendix C).  
 




TRUE BEST VALUE MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 
Preparation 
 Schedule development 
 Strategic plan,           
 Measurements 
 Core team education   
 Objectives and roles     
established 
 Focus on specific project 
 No strategic plan 
 No measurements 
 No core team 
Selection 
 Pre-bid meeting w/ 
contractors/vendors  
 Objective past performance 
 Interviews 
 Best value selection 
 SSEB established 
 Price and non-price criteria 
 Trade-off analysis 
 ―Best value‖ selection  
 
Pre-Award 
 QC Plan identifying risks 
and minimization added to 
contract 
 Schedule and weekly report 
added to contract 
 Project risks and control 
transferred to contractor 
 Contractor selected by SSA 
 Proof of insurance, performance 
bond, and  minority subcontractor 
participation required to award 
Risk 
Management 
 Weekly reports document 
cost and schedule contract 
changes and risks that 
caused them 
 Reports record contractor’s 
performance responding to 
risks it did not control 
 Continuous improvement 
 All project risks are assumed by 
the owner 
 USACE provides construction 
inspection services 
 Subjective contractor performance 
ratings 





  71 
 
 The differences between the two best value project delivery processes are striking. 
True best value project delivery is an information system providing documentation of the 
impact of risks on cost and schedule growth along with contractors’ performance in 
dealing with these risks. An authentic best value process imposes Peter Drucker’s idea for 
providing a foundation for continuous learning about how to deliver more value to 
customers. Genuine best value provides a pattern for increasing construction performance 
by implementing strategic benchmarking methodology like aligning the project with the 
owner’s organizational strategic plan. A best value procurement system also incorporates 
Six Sigma Define–Measure–Analyze-Improve Control (DMAIC) concepts into its 
process by providing provisions for performance measurement, project data analyses, and 
transitioning of lessons learned back into the process permitting continuous improvement 
(Watson, 2007). 
 Conversely, the modified Military Transformation best value process lacks 
strategic benchmarking principles. The owner’s strategic plan, performance 
measurement, and an objective means for collection and analysis of data for work 
performance trends and consistency are missing. Military Transformation does not force 
identification of risks or provide for their minimization; rather it exposes the owner to 
unanticipated risks associated with the project. Additionally, without a perpetual 
improvement model, the probability of unexpected but recurring risks on future projects 
is high. Project control and risk from preparation through construction completion firmly 
resides with the owner. Construction inspection services are used with the hope that 
minimum quality standards are achieved. Once the perceived best value contractor is 
selected there is practically no incentive for it to perform above obligatory contract 
requirements either for the present project or in anticipation of potential future contracts. 
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CCASS past performance ratings are primarily used to confirm satisfactory compliance 
with minimum contractual requirement on past government projects as a ―pass–fail‖ 
selection criterion. Any additional past performance information (references, awards, 
letters, etc.) receive only subjective consideration by future SSEBs. 





 This thesis research and examination of AFRC MILCON project data, surveys of 
AFRC project delivery professionals, and a case study of implementation of USACE’s 
Military Transformation best value project delivery system results in the following 
conclusions: 
A. Air Force Reserve construction schedule growth has approached 50% over the 
most recent 10 year period. 
B. Approximately 30% of Air Force Reserve MILCON projects over the most recent 
5 year period have been awarded at prices above the project programmed budget. 
C. Introduction of non-price selection factors as per FAR Part 15.101 has had no 
beneficial effect on limiting cost overruns, schedule growth and construction 
modifications in the AFRC MILCON project delivery process. 
D. AFRC construction delivery professionals only marginally understand best value 
project procurement principles. The survey reveals that these professionals lack 
an understanding/appreciation for: (1) continuous improvement; (2) who should 
identify and control risks; and (3) information management theories. In addition, 
these delivery professionals exhibit a significant propensity for desiring to control 
rather than facilitate the project delivery process. 
E. The USACE best value procurement vehicle known as Military Transformation 
fails to deliver true best value. This pseudo best value delivery process: (1)  fails 
to objectively rate and apply contractor past performance; (2) lacks the means to 
monetarily quantify contractor proposal risks; and (3) provides no means of 
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transferring control and responsibility for risks and risk minimization to the 
contractor. 
 The Air Force Reserve Command is earnestly seeking alternatives to the 
traditional low bid project delivery process because of its increasingly perceived inability 
to produce facility construction value necessary to meet mission requirements. Only a 
true best value project delivery system can provide this urgently required increased 
efficiency. AFRC and USACE are reluctant to cede project control to those in the best 
position to decrease the risk of nonperformance, i.e. contractors and vendors. Contractor 
selection processes supply no contractor incentive to provide value in expectation of 
receiving future work. Mammoth government bureaucracy inundated with voluminous 
rules, decrees, and paradigms hinders the ability to change and move toward the best 









Survey on Military Construction Procurement using 
Best Value  
 
Please circle the letter beside the letter corresponding to your answer. Thank you for your 
participation. 
 
1) Which of the following best describes your definition of best value in terms of 
military project procurement? 
 
a) The contractor representing the best value is the one meeting the    
minimally acceptable qualification evaluation factors and proposing the 
lowest price.  
b) The contractor having the best qualifications and who offers a price within 
the project’s budget (programming amount) is the best value. 
c) The best value contractor is the one with acceptable past performance and 
offering the lowest price. 
d) The best value contractor is the one whose qualifications, including past 
performance, technical ability and experience when combined with price 
provides the best opportunity for successful execution at the least risk.  




2) Best Value procurement can be used with which of the following delivery 
methods? 
 
a) Design-Build  
b) Design-Bid-Build 
c) Construction Management at-Risk 
d) a and b above 
e) b and c above 
f) all of the above  
 





3) In order to receive greater performance and value in a construction contract you 
have to pay more. 
 
a) True 
b) False  
c) Not Sure 
 
4) Which of the following statements about Best Value procurement are true? 
a) Trust between the contractor and owner/client is required. 
b) The construction industry controls the quality of construction. 
c) Best Value is a selection process. 
d) Partnering is a valuable tool in resolving issues. 
e) All of the above. 
f) None of the above.  
 
5) Who should assume responsibility for identifying risks to the project and 
minimizing the risks that are beyond their control in Best Value procurement? 
a) Contractor  
b) Government 
c) Both in a partnering session 





6) The FAR (Federal Acquisition Regulation) specifically prohibits evaluation of 
contractor past performance using numerical rating systems. 
a) True 
b) False  
c) Not Sure 
 
7) The Best Value contractor’s Quality Control (QC) Plan is a document describing 
how the contractor will control its personnel on the job.  
a) True 
b) False  
c) Not Sure 
8) The ability to conduct brief interviews with key personnel prior to contractor 
selection adds significant value in selecting the Best Value contractor. 
a) True  
b) False 
c) Not Sure 
9) The ability, capacity, and experience of a contractor are difficult to determine 
and that determination is generally subjective to a significant degree. 
a) True 
b) False 
c) Not Sure 
 
 




10) Do you agree with the following statement as it applies to construction project 
delivery : “The greater a person’s ability to perceive and utilize a high degree of 
pertinent project information, the more willing they are to  allow other members of 
the project team to dictate the amount of information and control they need.” 
a) Agree 
b) Disagree 
c) Not Sure  
d) What are you talking about? 





AFRC  MILCON CONSTRUCTION  SCHEDULE & COST GROWTH 1992 - 2007
Program Avenue:  MCP









Orig Contr  
Amt













92 JET FUEL STORAGE COMPLEX $1,100,000 29-Sep-92 T 1-Jul-94 28-Jul-94 $1,132,065 $1,132,065 0 27 365 7.4 0
1992 Fiscal Year Total: $1,100,000 - 1 Project                     (Averages) 0 7.4 0
93 CORROSION CNTL/FUEL SYS MAINT $1,000,000 25-Mar-94 T 29-Feb-96 13-Feb-96 $971,100 $1,078,705 11.1 315 360 87.5 14
COMPOSITE MAINTENANCE FACILITY $2,600,000 1-Feb-94 T 1-Sep-96 17-Feb-97 $2,550,517 $2,681,403 5.1 169 555 30.5 19
AVIONICS SHOP $2,300,000 1-Feb-94 T 1-Sep-96 17-Feb-97 $1,853,965 $1,983,290 7.0 169 555 30.5 15
AIRCRAFT HANGAR FIRE PROTECTN $1,000,000 1-Feb-94 T 1-Sep-96 17-Feb-97 $745,358 $777,044 4.3 169 555 30.5 12
ADD/ALT FACILITIES FOR CONV $2,300,000 1-Feb-94 T 1-Sep-96 17-Feb-97 $1,807,160 $1,994,445 10.4 169 555 30.5 32
BC-AFRES AIRCRAFT MAINT HANGAR $12,700,000 13-Sep-93 DB 1-Dec-96 1-Jun-97 $11,172,824 $11,474,838 2.7 182 642 28.3 46
BC-AFRES SPEC PURPOSE HANGAR $5,100,000 13-Sep-93 DB 1-Dec-96 29-Apr-97 $4,508,538 $4,709,674 4.5 149 642 23.2 40
BC-AFRES MUNITIONS MAINT/STOR $3,687,000 8-Jun-94 T 1-Dec-96 3-Feb-97 $3,212,340 $3,245,140 1.0 64 450 14.2 8
BC-AFRES COMPOSITE MAINT FAC $5,246,000 13-Sep-93 DB 1-Dec-96 15-Feb-97 $4,615,666 $4,767,426 3.3 76 642 11.8 34
BC-AFRES WEAPONS REL/CREW TRNG $2,783,000 13-Sep-93 DB 1-Dec-96 15-Dec-96 $2,427,674 $2,472,496 1.8 14 642 2.2 5
BC-AFRES EXTEND UTILITIES $1,800,000 13-Sep-93 T 1-Dec-96 12-Dec-96 $388,298 $445,943 14.8 11 642 1.7 13
BC-AFRES ALT FAC FOR WING O&T $2,577,000 11-Feb-94 T 1-Mar-97 9-Dec-96 $1,074,417 $1,072,100 -0.2 0 120 0.0 2
1993 Fiscal Year Total: $43,093,000 - 12 Projects               (Averages) 5.5 24.2 20
94 REPLACE AIRCRAFT PARKING APRON $13,373,000 27-Jun-94 T 1-Oct-96 4-Oct-96 $6,370,134 $9,958,213 56.3 3 540 0.6 25
1994 Fiscal Year Total: $13,373,000 - 1 Projects                 (Averages) 56.3 0.6 25
95 COMPOSITE MAINTENANCE HANGAR $1,800,000 28-Sep-95 T 4-Dec-96 31-Dec-96 $1,772,825 $1,772,825 0.0 26 460 5.7 0
RENOVATE AIRMEN DINING FAC $2,650,000 26-Mar-96 T 26-Mar-97 30-Mar-98 $2,384,444 $2,384,444 0.0 369 365 101.1 0
SQUADRON OPERATIONS FACILITY $1,900,000 22-Sep-95 T 22-Sep-96 4-Dec-96 $1,731,675 $1,731,675 0.0 73 460 15.9 0
1995 Fiscal Year Total: $6,350,000 - 3 Projects                 ( Averages) 0 40.9 0
96 BC-AFRES ALTER SQUAD OPS/TRNG $760,000 8-May-96 T 4-Dec-96 24-Dec-96 $542,100 $574,775 6.0 20 210 9.5 9
BC-SECURITY POLICE FLIGHT $900,000 23-Sep-96 T 10-Feb-98 26-Feb-98 $859,083 $859,083 0.0 16 450 3.6 1
BC-GROUP HEADQUARTERS $4,100,000 23-Sep-96 T 26-Feb-98 26-Feb-98 $4,421,979 $4,421,979 0.0 0 450 0.0 0
BC-ALTER SHOPS $2,800,000 9-Mar-96 T 5-Sep-97 5-Sep-97 $2,439,273 $2,518,016 3.2 0 720 0.0 20
BC-ALTER MAINT HANGAR $5,900,000 9-Mar-96 T 30-Jan-98 30-Jan-98 $5,229,082 $5,381,725 2.9 0 720 0.0 21
BC-AFRES ADAL AERIAL PORT $360,000 9-Mar-96 T 30-Dec-97 3-Oct-97 $324,879 $347,893 7.1 0 720 0.0 3
BC-ADD MEDICAL TRAINING FAC $700,000 23-Sep-96 T 10-Feb-98 26-Feb-98 $688,938 $688,938 0.0 16 365 4.4 0
1996 Fiscal Year Total: $15,520,000 - 7 Projects                (Averages) 2.8 2.5 7.7
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97 BC- PARARESCURE TRAINING FAC $2,650,000 30-Sep-97 T 5-May-99 24-Jul-99 $3,027,437 $3,074,656 1.6 80 365 21.9 7
BC-ALTER FOUR MISC SHOPS $500,000 19-Sep-97 T 30-Apr-99 19-Jun-99 $320,000 $325,008 1.6 50 245 20.4 2
BC-ALTER COMBAT CAMERA $1,200,000 29-May-97 T 6-Feb-98 13-Mar-98 $494,442 $599,201 21.2 35 210 16.7 7
FIRE TRAINING FACILITY $2,500,000 30-Dec-96 T 26-Oct-97 18-Feb-99 $2,090,000 $2,106,133 0.8 780 300 260.0 1
UPGRADE STORM DRAINAGE SYSTEM $1,150,000 27-Sep-97 T 15-Sep-98 15-Oct-98 $773,000 $890,449 15.2 30 330 9.1 1
WING HEADQUARTERS FACILITY $5,300,000 30-Dec-96 T 15-Dec-98 28-May-98 $4,714,700 $4,714,700 0.0 0 540 0.0 0
MEDICAL TRAINING/ADMIN $2,300,000 12-May-97 T 22-Jun-98 18-Jun-98 $2,333,000 $2,347,174 0.6 0 360 0.0 2
MEDICAL TRAINING FACILITY $2,500,000 21-Mar-97 T 15-May-98 4-Jun-99 $2,011,750 $2,049,250 1.9 385 360 106.9 4
IMPROVE STORM DRAINAGE SYSTEM $950,000 30-Sep-97 T 15-Feb-99 30-Jun-99 $705,366 $705,366 0.0 135 300 45.0 0
FUELS SYSTEMS MAINTENANCE HGR $6,000,000 11-Mar-98 T 15-Jun-99 17-May-99 $6,100,000 $6,100,000 0.0 0 360 0.0 0
FIRE TRAINING FACILITY $1,500,000 30-Dec-96 T 2-Jul-98 18-Feb-99 $1,254,969 $1,254,969 0.0 231 300 77.0 1
CONSOLIDATED MEDICAL TRAINING $2,600,000 30-Sep-97 T 30-Dec-98 30-Dec-98 $2,401,027 $2,699,112 12.4 0 180 0.0 4
CONSOLIDATED MAINTENANCE FAC $3,600,000 12-Mar-97 T 24-Apr-98 29-May-98 $3,529,950 $3,529,950 0.0 35 360 9.7 0
COMPOSITE MAINTENANCE FACILITY $3,200,000 15-Nov-96 T 5-Mar-98 16-Jun-98 $2,877,859 $2,877,859 0.0 103 420 24.5 0
BC-MUNITIONS STORAGE $1,500,000 10-Jul-97 T 5-Jul-98 15-Oct-98 $1,192,379 $1,202,379 0.8 102 360 0.0 1
AWACS MISSION $3,400,000 1-Apr-97 T 15-Feb-98 29-May-98 $2,923,885 $2,923,885 0.0 103 285 36.1 0
ADAL FACILITIES FOR CONVERSION $5,700,000 16-Apr-97 T 14-May-98 6-May-99 $5,607,394 $5,607,394 0.0 357 365 97.8 0
1997 Fiscal Year Total: $46,550,000 - 17 Projects              (Averages) 3.3 42.7 1.8
98 FIRE TRAINING FACILITY $1,800,000 3-Aug-98 T 29-Jul-99 27-Apr-01 $1,546,434 $1,623,024 5.0 638 360 177.2 10
CONSOLIDATED TRAINING FACILITY $2,100,000 17-Sep-98 T 14-Jul-99 22-Jun-00 $1,479,650 $1,514,466 2.4 344 300 114,7 3
RENOVATE BLDG 220 - HQ AFRES $5,580,000 28-Sep-95 T 20-Jan-97 29-Mar-97 $6,331,000 $6,365,632 0.5 68 480 14.2 2
CORROSION CONTROL FACILITY $1,550,000 29-Jan-98 T 24-Apr-99 7-Apr-99 $1,530,198 $1,530,198 0.0 0 450 0 0
BASE CIVIL ENGINEER COMPLEX $8,913,000 20-Aug-98 DB 10-May-00 30-May-00 $7,928,100 $7,928,100 0.0 20 540 3.7 0
ALTER MISCELLANEOUS MAINT FAC $1,000,000 18-Dec-97 T 18-Dec-98 30-Dec-99 $842,000 $842,000 0.0 377 365 103.3 0
AERIAL PORT TRAINING FACILTY $4,200,000 17-Sep-98 T 3-Feb-00 13-Apr-01 $3,159,317 $3,159,317 0.0 435 415 104.8 0
ADD/ALTER BASE SUPPLY $2,800,000 18-Dec-97 T 15-Jun-99 15-Dec-99 $2,163,661 $2,163,661 0.0 183 365 50.1 0
ADAL SQUAD OPS FACILITY $1,400,000 18-Dec-97 T 15-Jun-99 30-Dec-99 $1,018,000 $1,018,000 0.0 183 365 50.1 0
1998 Fiscal Year Total: $29,343,000 - 9 Projects               (Averages) 0.9 55.9 1.7
99 CONSOLIDATED MAINTENANCE FAC $5,200,000 31-Mar-99 T 23-Feb-01 15-Jun-01 $4,396,000 $4,649,862 5.8 112 420 26.7 6
RENOVATE VAQ 478 $4,600,000 1-Sep-99 T 21-Nov-00 21-Nov-00 $3,113,585 $3,113,585 0.0 0 390 0.0 0
RENOVATE MAINTENANCE HANGAR 4 $5,200,000 19-Apr-99 T 12-Jun-00 5-Aug-03 $4,753,000 $4,753,000 0.0 1149 420 273.6 0
PARARESCUE FACILITY $1,400,000 28-Sep-00 T 23-Jul-01 20-Aug-01 $1,455,307 $1,455,307 0.0 28 270 10.3 0
MUNITIONS HAND EQUIPT MAINT $1,900,000 23-Jul-99 T 29-Nov-00 29-Nov-00 $1,688,354 $1,688,354 0.0 0 360 0.0 0
CONSOLIDATED MEDICAL FACILITY $3,400,000 27-Aug-99 T 23-Sep-00 23-Dec-01 $2,745,820 $2,920,920 6.4 456 360 126.7 17
CONSOLIDATED MAINTENANCE FAC $3,900,000 30-Jun-99 T 15-May-01 22-May-02 $3,031,400 $3,031,400 0.0 372 420 88.6 0
CONSOLIDATED LODGING FAC PH 1 $3,236,000 11-Aug-99 T 1-Jun-01 5-Sep-01 $3,764,682 $3,764,682 0.0 96 540 17.8 0
ALTER FAC FOR C-141 SIMULATOR $1,600,000 25-Jan-99 T 10-Aug-99 3-Sep-99 $1,446,000 $1,521,911 5.2 24 180 13.3 14
1999 Fiscal Year Total: $30,436,000 - 9 Projects               (Averages) 1.9 61.9 4.1
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    00 CONTROL TOWER $4,250,000 28-Mar-00 T 16-Jan-02 9-Aug-02 $4,033,800 $4,064,240 0.8 205 631 32.5 6
ADD/ALTER AFRC HQ & ATACC $14,000,000 22-Sep-00 DB 11-Dec-03 28-Jul-04 $13,519,500 $14,939,071 10.5 117 999 11.7 6
AERIAL PORT TRAINING FACILITY $800,000 28-Feb-00 T 25-Jan-01 18-Apr-01 $774,400 $800,146 3.3 21 321 6.5 12
LODGING FACILITY $6,300,000 29-Jun-00 T 10-Mar-02 30-May-02 $6,233,032 $6,233,032 0.0 20 615 3.3 0
LODGING AND DINING HALL $10,800,000 28-Sep-00 DB 13-Aug-02 18-Jul-03 $9,742,900 $9,742,900 0.0 339 660 51.4 0
FIRE TRAINING FACILITY $2,000,000 27-Jun-00 T 23-Apr-01 31-Aug-01 $1,892,000 $1,892,000 0.0 130 300 43.3 0
FIRE STATION $2,950,000 30-Oct-00 T 30-Dec-01 30-Nov-02 $2,666,500 $2,666,500 0.0 335 426 78.6 0
DEICING RECOVERY PAD $3,400,000 28-Sep-00 NULL 22-Nov-01 22-Nov-01 $1,948,400 $1,948,400 0.0 0 270 0.0 0
CONSOLIDATED LODGING FAC PH 2 $8,140,000 30-Mar-00 T 3-Oct-01 3-Oct-01 $7,456,000 $7,456,000 0.0 0 600 0.0 0
C-17 ADAL SQ OPS FAC $3,300,000 30-Mar-00 T 25-Feb-02 4-Apr-02 $2,912,800 $2,912,800 0.0 38 575 6.6 0
ADAL FACS FOR C130H AIRCREW TG $2,130,000 29-Sep-00 T 11-Dec-01 17-Jun-03 $2,319,934 $2,319,934 0.0 553 400 38.3 0
2000 Fiscal Year Total: $58,070,000 - 11 Projects             (Averages) 1.3 24.7 2.2
    01 ADAL FIRE STATION, PHASE II $2,000,000 4-Mar-01 T 15-Apr-03 14-Feb-04 $1,691,000 $1,691,000 0.0 305 333 91.6 0
ALTER HANGAR AND ADD AFFF $2,400,000 14-Sep-01 T 12-Aug-02 30-Sep-03 $2,125,000 $2,125,000 0.0 414 330 25.5 0
C-130 ASSAULT STRIP $5,951,000 24-Aug-01 T 23-Sep-02 12-Jun-03 $5,839,880 $5,839,880 0.0 262 360 72.8 0
SERVICES COMPLEX PHASE 2 $11,290,000 21-Sep-01 T 15-Jun-03 9-Feb-04 $10,192,305 $10,192,305 0.0 239 450 53.1 0
SMALL ARMS MUNITIONS STORAGE $700,000 8-Aug-94 T 2-Dec-95 2-Dec-95 $504,599 $504,599 0.0 0 450 0.0 0
REPAIR/ALTER AIRMAN QUARTERS $7,450,000 3-Aug-01 T 8-Dec-02 19-May-03 $6,687,700 $6,984,446 4.4 129 450 28.7 6
2001 Fiscal Year Total: $29,791,000 - 6 Projects              (Averages) 0.7 45.3 1
    02 C-130J MAINTENANCE HANGAR $12,000,000 28-Mar-02 DB 14-Apr-04 23-Jun-04 $8,936,000 $9,031,590 1.1 161 720 22.4 8
ADD/ALTER AFRC HQ & ATACC $2,000,000 29-Mar-02 DB 9-Apr-04 28-Jul-04 $1,347,535 $1,890,595 40.3 67 738 9.1 8
Services Comples - Dormitory $13,200,000 28-Jun-02 T 20-Oct-04 15-Dec-04 $10,263,000 $10,263,000 0.0 56 540 10.4 0
FUEL CELL MAINTENANCE HANGAR $7,300,000 16-Aug-02 T 6-Jul-04 7-Feb-05 $4,905,593 $4,905,593 0.0 216 690 31.3 0
CONSOLIDATED LODGING PH 3 $8,400,000 3-May-02 T 26-May-03 16-Oct-03 $7,734,000 $7,734,000 0.0 143 360 39.7 0
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE HANGAR $9,900,000 16-Aug-02 T 6-Jul-04 6-Mar-05 $7,424,207 $7,424,207 0.0 243 690 35.2 0
ADD/ALTER SQUAD OPS FACILITY $1,400,000 30-Sep-02 T 12-Jun-03 27-Feb-04 $1,547,615 $1,547,615 0.0 230 300 76.7 0
ADD/ALTER COMM CENTER $2,000,000 21-Sep-02 T 29-Nov-03 4-Nov-04 $1,825,788 $1,825,788 0.0 341 360 94.7 0
2002 Fiscal Year Total: $56,200,000 - 8 Projects            (Averages) 5.2 39.9 2
    03 SECURITY FORCES OPERATION $3,850,000 25-Sep-03 DB 30-Jul-05 2-Mar-06 $3,759,000 $3,794,638 0.9 128 720 17.8 6
SERVICES TRAINING FACILITY $2,500,000 9-Sep-03 T 18-Nov-04 12-Mar-05 $2,780,000 $2,780,000 0.0 114 360 31.7 0
MEDICIAL TRAINING ADDN $2,150,000 27-Jun-03 DB 20-Aug-04 30-Jun-04 $1,867,582 $1,867,582 0.0 0 311 0 0
Hydrant Refueling System and Parking Overlay$6,400,000 29-Aug-03 T 12-Oct-04 15-Mar-06 $5,770,000 $5,770,000 0.0 519 450 115.3 0
ENTRANCE F.P. - VISITOR CENTER $2,000,000 19-Sep-03 T 18-Nov-04 12-Jul-05 $2,094,644 $2,094,644 0.0 236 360 65.6 0
Cosolidated Space Group Operations $6,900,000 5-Sep-03 DB 1-Jun-05 14-Feb-05 $6,317,225 $6,317,225 0.0 0 450 0 0
Consolidated Training Phase 1 $1,609,000 12-Aug-03 T 10-Sep-04 13-Jul-06 $1,573,567 $1,573,567 0.0 0 365 0 0
Consolidated Lodging Facility $6,300,000 25-Feb-04 T 15-May-04 15-Jun-05 $3,391,109 $3,391,109 0.0 671 360 186.3 0
CONST INSTLTN PERIMETER FENCE $1,100,000 15-Aug-03 DB 8-May-04 9-Jun-04 $1,020,276 $1,020,276 0.0 396 210 188.6 0
C-17, ALTER CO-LOCATED LIFE SUPPORT $3,000,000 17-Sep-03 T 29-Sep-04 14-Jun-05 $2,925,088 $2,925,088 0.0 32 360 8.9 0
C-17 MAINTENANCE & INSPECTION HANGAR [2307]$15,10 ,000 31-Jul-03 DB 28-Feb-05 23-May-05 $11,227,018 $11,411,703 1.6 84 540 15.6 3
C-17 Alter Squadron Operations Facility $1,700,000 29-Aug-03 T 26-Jun-04 1-May-04 $1,608,877 $1,608,877 0.0 0 360 0 0
C-17 ALTER GEN MAINT SHOPS $2,000,000 14-Aug-03 T 29-Aug-04 27-Sep-05 $2,418,345 $2,418,345 0.0 394 360 109.4 0
C-17 ALTER FLIGHT SIMULATOR FACILITY(BLDG 600)$1,900, 0 2-Sep-03 T 16-Aug-04 14-Aug-04 $1,669,645 $1,727,182 3.4 0 300 0 2
Alter Maintenance Hangar $525,000 12-Aug-03 T 15-Sep-04 13-Jul-06 $394,145 $394,145 0.0 666 365 182.5 0
Alter Maintenance Facilities $2,650,000 12-Aug-03 T 15-Sep-04 13-Jul-06 $2,697,246 $2,697,246 0.0 666 365 182.5 0
2003 Fiscal Year Total: $59,684,000 - 16 Projects           (Averages) 0.4 69.0 0.3
 








The PIPS project delivery system provides best value by injecting common sense and 
sound judgment into the process. This system places diminished value on management 
choosing to substitute leadership in its place and thus add efficiency and value to the 
project delivery blueprint.  This best value strategy reduces the need for owner control, 
expertise, and information and transfers accountability without having to trust in people. 
PIPS has demonstrated the ability to take full advantage of competition while increasing 
contractor profits. Further, this delivery system incorporates Total Quality Management 
(TQM) principles by encouraging continuous improvement. When analyzed from the 
standpoint of a single project, there are four major PIPS phases: 
1. Preparation  
2. Selection  
3. Pre-award  
4. Risk Management  
 
Preparation Phase 
 The following activities encompass the PIPS preparation phase: 
1. Schedule development 
2. Definitions, strategic plan, measurements, project education, core team selection 
3. Core Team objectives and roles 
 




4. Project selection 
5. Request For Proposal (RFP) 
6. Weighting of performance criteria 
7. Contractor/vendors education meeting(s) 
8. Past performance criteria 
 The purpose of schedule development is to develop a timetable for the various 
milestones to be accomplished in all four phases of the PIPS process. Strategic planning 
and what measurement system to employ are the most important elements used to 
implement this project delivery course. They specify the expected outcomes and serve as 
a model to ensure the goals and objectives of each activity are obtained. Core team 
education is conducted by Performance Based Studies Research Group (PBSRG) of 
Arizona State University. The purpose of this education is to identify core team members 
and any resistance within the organization. Additionally, the education should include 
recognition of previous performance and best value justification, beginning with 
individual perceptions of past performance and what constitutes best value. High 
performance contractors/vendors/suppliers should participate in this presentation. The 
core team should include the following: 
 A high level executive 
 Legal representative 
 Mid level manager 
 Project manager 
 Procurement/contracts person 




 Information worker 
 The project manager is a key component in successful PIPS implementation. He 
or she must be able to explain PIPS because this will be the person ensuring system 
operation. This information worker makes certain that all measurements are accurate, up 
to date, and available if questions of a political nature arise during the process.  
 Selection of a project for PIPS implementation should depend on project budget, 
the core team’s ability and willingness to learn new procedures, the ability to justify 
implementation costs to senior management, and the owner’s strategic plan. The core 
team should put together a traditional RFP; the PBSRG team will modify the RFP and 
convert it to a best value document. The owner’s legal representative will review and 
approve the RFP. 
 Performance criteria weighting is unique for each owner and project. The weights 
should be based upon the owner’s distinct requirements and expectations and not upon 
anticipated project risks. Typical weighing criteria are price and performance. Current 
capacity and past performance encompass sub-criteria to be evaluated in determination of 
a contractor’s ability to perform. Other criteria like minority program participation, 
experience with Design-Build, and safety record can be added. 
 An education meeting for contractors/vendors will explain the PIPS best value 
project delivery process. This meeting should inform these contract personnel of what 
past performance information will be evaluated, in what form and when to present it and  
to whom. The contractor is allowed to select its own references. This prevents (1) 
arguments from contractors that the wrong projects were selected for evaluation; (2)  




accusations of unfairness; (3) questioning whether too many or too few references were 
evaluated; and (4) questions regarding the validity of a reference. 
Selection Phase 
The Selection Phase of PIPS begins when the following are complete: 
 owner education 
 core team formation and education 
 project selection and RFP creation 
 contractor/vendor selection 
 performance information collection  
The following activities are in the Selection Phase: 
1. Pre-bid/proposal meeting 
2. Contractor completion of past performance information 
3. Contractor submittal of  proposals 
4. Owner interviews contractor’s key personnel (project manager, site 
superintendent, chief designer, etc.) 
5. Evaluation and prioritization of all alternatives 
6. Best value contractor chosen to move into Pre-Award Phase 
 The pre-bid meeting is used to explain the project and the PIPS best value 
selection and delivery process to contractors/vendors. The remainder of the items covered  
in this meeting are typical of all such meetings: (1) identify schedule and critical 
milestones; (2) answer questions about the project; (3) visit the project site; and (4)  
 




establish a time for Request For Information (RFI) along with the expectation of a written 
reply to the same. 
 The Risk Assessment/Value Added (RAVA) blueprint submittal is a major 
selection criterion and important element of the proposal.  The purpose of this plan 
includes: 
 Identification of risks that the contractor does not control. 
 Explanation of how the contractor will minimize the risk. 
 Show how the contractor can work in a team oriented, visionary, experienced 
method to successfully complete the project. 
 Contractor identification of project inputs that will add quality, reduce time or 
costs and thus add value.  
 The other part of the proposal is the value added submittal. Value added 
submittals include (1) anything that distinguishes a contractor from the competition; (2) 
items with potential cost impact; and (3) any out of scope work required. If allowed 
within the owner’s legal constraints, value added items should be considered during the 
Pre-Award Phase. 
 Interviews are conducted with key personnel that will have an impact on the 
project. Each interview is recommended to last a maximum of twenty minutes with 
questions designed to show the ability of the person to minimize project delivery risks  
they do not control. The interview is one filter to determine if there is one outstanding 
individual whose ability stands out above all the rest. 
 Prioritization of the proposals has two main phases: 




1. The objective assessment of the proposals using past performance, RAVA, and 
interviews. 
2. The subjective assessment of best value. Verifying the best value based on price 
and the financial constraints of the project. 
 Technical qualifications give a proposal a best value advantage only if they can be 
translated into performance attributes of best value. These qualifications when used as a 
prequalification mechanism should be rated as go or no go only. 
 
Pre-Award Phase 
 The contractor whose proposal is deemed to comprise the best value alternative 
per the Selection Phase criteria proceeds to the Pre-Award Phase.  This phase is initiated 
with a pre-award kickoff meeting. The best value contractor is provided with all the risks 
identified by the other contractors and required to add them to its quality control plan. 
During the Pre-Award Phase: 
1. The contractor decides if it is still interested in pursuing the project.  
2. The contractor identifies all subcontractors and coordinates the decision to 
proceed with the best value proposal with these subcontractors.  
3. The owner’s professional project technical representative(s) reviews the 
contractor’s technical approach and notifies the owner of any potential issues. 
4. The Quality Control (QC) Plan is created. 
5. The weekly report is established. 
6. The QC Plan, weekly report, and schedule are coordinated. 




7. Documents are reviewed by the owner’s technical representative(s). 
8. The core team holds a pre-award presentation. 
9. The contractor’s QC Plan and weekly report are added to the contract. 
 The QC Plan is the contractor’s plan to control the work. It should inform the 
other project delivery team members of the manner in which the project risks, which it 
doesn’t control, will be minimized. The QC Plan and weekly risk report transfer both risk 
and control to the contractor and protects the contractor against owner directives that can 
jeopardize the project schedule and/or budget. 
 
Risk Management Phase 
 During this final PIPS phase the contractor’s weekly report provides a history of 
the project. This report documents: 
1. Changes in the project schedule or cost. 
2. Changes to the contract (modifications). 
3. Risks that resulted in contract changes. 
4. Explanations of the risks in (3.) including their source(s), why they were not 
minimized and what was done in the contract modifications to reduce the risks. 
5. Performance of the contractor in reaction to risks it did not control. 
 The weekly report consists of the project vital statistics including the schedule and 
a risk report page identifying the date, minimization plan, resolution, and impact of 
individual risks associated with the project. The weekly risk report addresses risks that  
 




are unforeseen and/or that the contractor does not control but for which it is trying to 
reduce the impact even if it is not legally responsible to do so. 
 Any risk that conveys cost and time repercussions is apt to result in a change 
order. These changes should be recorded along with the risks that precipitated them and 
an explanation of the solutions. This allows the high performing contractor to document 
its performance and illustrate its actions in managing project risks. The weekly report, in 
spreadsheet format, should be sent to the project director’s electronic mail address. This 
director is presumably the owner’s highest ranking executive core team member. The 
spreadsheet defends and protects the contractor. It affects its communication, 
professionalism, and performance score at the end of the project. The weekly /director’s 
report should allow a contractor to influence upward movement of a project experiencing 
delay to the top of the owner’s list of at-risk projects. This compels the director to reduce 
the risks as soon as possible. The weekly reporting system and director’s report protects 
the contractor and is in its best interest. 
 Upon project completion the contractor is rated. The project is complete when: 
 All punch list items have been addressed and resolved. 
 All systems perform as designed. 
 All systems documentation including warranties and as-builts has been completed 
and submitted to the appropriate owner’s representatives. 
 The site has been cleaned and is ready for use/occupancy. 
 The contractor is then rated and its future past performance rating is modified by 
including this project rating into the new performance average. Best value project ratings  




are weighted heavier than past performance ratings from other projects. (Kashiwagi, 
2002,) 
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